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	<title>Jacopo Piemonte Archives - Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</title>
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	<title>Jacopo Piemonte Archives - Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</title>
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		<title>ITALIAN AI LAW: WHAT COMPANIES NEED TO DO</title>
		<link>https://www.dejalex.com/2025/09/italian-ai-law-what-companies-need-to-do/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[team valletta]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2025 16:36:44 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Employment and Pensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaspare Roma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ilaria Uletto]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jacopo Piemonte]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Publications]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" />The article by Gaspare Roma, Jacopo Piemonte and Ilaria Uletto on Agenda Digitale</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/09/italian-ai-law-what-companies-need-to-do/">ITALIAN AI LAW: WHAT COMPANIES NEED TO DO</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" /><p>The new Artificial Intelligence Bill, approved on September 17, 2025, aligns Italy with the European Regulation and introduces rules for the ethical, safe, and transparent use of algorithms in business, with particular attention to the protection of workers. The goal: to ensure that AI is a support tool and does not replace human decision-making.</p>
<p>What obligations does it impose on companies?</p>
<p><strong>Gaspare Roma, Jacopo Piemonte and Ilaria Uletto</strong> explain in a feature on <strong>Agenda Digitale</strong>, highlighting that companies are required, inter alia, to inform their employees and trade union representatives about the AI systems adopted, update privacy notices and processing records in line with GDPR, promote training and digital literacy programs to make workers aware of the risks and opportunities linked to AI, and responsibly manage all risks connected with the use of algorithms in work processes.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://www.agendadigitale.eu/cultura-digitale/legge-ia-nuove-tutele-e-obblighi-per-un-uso-responsabile-in-azienda/">“<i  class="x-icon x-icon-link" data-x-icon-s="&#xf0c1;" aria-hidden="true"></i> Read the full article in italian.</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/09/italian-ai-law-what-companies-need-to-do/">ITALIAN AI LAW: WHAT COMPANIES NEED TO DO</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
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		<title>INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: OPPORTUNITIES AND EMERGING CHALLENGES</title>
		<link>https://www.dejalex.com/2025/09/international-arbitration-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence-opportunities-and-emerging-challenges/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[team valletta]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Sep 2025 11:01:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Arbitration and ADR]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Digital/Tech]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Giulio Angius]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jacopo Piemonte]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Publications]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" />The article by Jacopo Piemonte, Francesca Borio and Giulio Angius</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/09/international-arbitration-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence-opportunities-and-emerging-challenges/">INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: OPPORTUNITIES AND EMERGING CHALLENGES</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />Artificial intelligence (hereinafter also “<strong>AI</strong>”) has become an integral part of modern society. While its use is sometimes criticized, and concerns remain about the potential replacement of human activity in certain fields, there is no denying that this emerging technology enhances work efficiency and simplifies many tasks. Given the rapid pace of development, those who choose not to engage with AI risk falling behind.

The use of AI-based systems in the legal field offers numerous advantages, but it also presents significant challenges. The same applies in the context of international arbitration.

In the sections that follow, the reader will find an overview of the main areas in which AI systems are currently being applied in arbitration proceedings (<strong>Section 1</strong>). This will be followed by an examination of the key challenges that arise from the use of such technologies in this context (<strong>Section 2</strong>). A brief overview of institutional rules and initiatives that have begun to address the integration of AI into arbitration will then be provided (<strong>Section 3</strong>). Finally, some concluding remarks and reflections on the way forward will be offered (<strong>Section 4</strong>).
<ol>
 	<li><strong>Potential Applications of Artificial Intelligence in Arbitration</strong></li>
</ol>
In international arbitration, AI can be highly valuable. It enables the automation of numerous legal tasks, helping to ease the workload of lawyers and arbitrators while enhancing the overall efficiency of proceedings. This technology can assist arbitration practitioners throughout the entire arbitral process, from the initiation of proceedings to their conclusion.

Among its various applications, AI is particularly effective in analyzing large volumes of documents. It facilitates both document review and fact-finding and streamlines the document production phase. For example, AI can be used to quickly generate chronologies, accurately identify documents by category, and redact sensitive information more efficiently.<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup>[1]</sup></a>

AI can also accelerate and improve the accuracy of legal research, enabling practitioners to quickly access relevant case law and precedents. It can provide high-quality machine translations, which simplify communication in international arbitrations and help reduce translation costs for annexes. Moreover, the drafting of standard documents &#8211; such as procedural orders, procedural calendars, or Redfern schedules &#8211; can be efficiently managed using AI-based systems.<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup>[2]</sup></a>

AI can also assist in analyzing arbitrator profiles, helping parties identify the most suitable candidates based on objective and tailored criteria.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup>[3]</sup></a>

In addition to the aspects already mentioned, AI systems also play a significant role in predictive analysis, offering parties and counsel advanced systems to preliminarily assess the likelihood of success in a given dispute or legal action.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> For example, several platforms available on the market use large case law databases to offer detailed insights into arbitral tribunals, judges, lawyers, and opposing parties. These systems claim to predict how different legal strategies may influence arbitral proceedings<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> and their outcomes by analyzing established trends and complex statistical models.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup>[6]</sup></a>

Some suggest that AI systems could even assist arbitrators in anticipating how an arbitral award might be treated in the future, such as the likelihood of it being set aside, refused enforcement, or freely enforced.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> This could help arbitrators draft decisions that, drawing on historical data and predictive models, are more likely to remain stable over time.<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup>[8]</sup></a>

Finally, AI could evolve to assist arbitrators in preparing the decision-making process, especially in highly complex disputes. These types of applications are already being used in ordinary litigation and class action proceedings.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> It is therefore possible that similar systems will also be adopted in international arbitration in the relatively near future (but see Section 2.4 below for potential challenges in this area).
<ol start="2">
 	<li><strong>Emerging challenges in the use of artificial intelligence</strong></li>
</ol>
While the benefits of artificial intelligence outlined above are undeniable, it is essential not to overlook the potential risks linked to its use in international arbitration. The following section examines some of the main issues that may arise in this context.

<strong>2.1 Data processing and training: the “black box” and “bias” problem</strong>

The “black box” problem in AI refers to the lack of transparency in how AI systems &#8211; particularly those based on complex algorithms like deep learning &#8211; reach their decisions.<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> This lack of transparency makes it difficult to understand, interpret, and trust the outcomes generated by AI systems. In the legal field, it raises significant ethical concerns, particularly regarding the reproduction of discriminatory patterns, commonly referred to as bias.

AI systems, after all, rely on the data they are fed.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> AI systems are trained on information that may include biased or unrepresentative data.<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup>[12]</sup></a> If such data is not identified and corrected, the algorithm trained on it may perpetuate &#8211; or even amplify &#8211; certain biases, leading to inaccurate or flawed outcomes.<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13"><sup>[13]</sup></a>

The risk of perpetuating stereotypes may arise, for example, when AI systems are used to select arbitrators based on statistical probabilities drawn from available data, particularly data reflecting the prevailing composition of arbitral tribunals in practice.<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14"><sup>[14]</sup></a>

<strong>2.2 Outdated data and “hallucinations”</strong>

AI requires access to up-to-date and relevant data in order to function effectively. If the system is fed outdated information, there is a risk that its analyses and recommendations will be out of context or no longer applicable to current circumstances.

In this regard, another significant challenge is the risk of so-called “hallucinations” generated by AI.<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15"><sup>[15]</sup></a> These occur when AI systems generate inaccurate or misleading responses based on non-existent or incorrect data.<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16"><sup>[16]</sup></a>  A notable example occurred during legal proceedings in the United States, where a defense team relied on an AI system to identify legal precedents to present at a hearing. It was only during the proceedings that the judge discovered those cases did not, in fact, exist.<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17"><sup>[17]</sup></a> Another emblematic incident took place in early 2025 in Norway, where a lawyer submitted fictitious sources generated by an AI system during court proceedings. This prompted the Norwegian Supreme Court to update its guidelines, introducing a new provision specifically aimed at regulating the use of AI in judicial proceedings.<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18"><sup>[18]</sup></a> These cases clearly highlighted the risks associated with the use of such technologies, particularly the tendency of some systems to produce inaccurate, misleading, or entirely fabricated content.

In the context of arbitration, this raises the very real possibility that AI-based systems could lead to the submission of documents containing errors or flawed assessments, especially if the underlying data is poorly managed.<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19"><sup>[19]</sup></a> It is therefore essential for lawyers and arbitrators to adopt a critical approach to AI technologies, ensuring through careful oversight that the information used is accurate, verifiable, and reliable.<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20"><sup>[20]</sup></a>

<strong>2.3 Duty of professional secrecy, data confidentiality </strong>

In addition to the points already mentioned, another important aspect must be considered, as lawyers are bound by a strict duty of professional secrecy.<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21"><sup>[21]</sup></a>

In an increasingly digitized age marked by the widespread use of AI systems, data relating to legal proceedings may not be fully protected when shared with AI solution providers or external platforms. In particular, there is a concrete risk that client information &#8211; such as case details or confidential documents &#8211; could be processed without adequate safeguards, potentially resulting in breaches of confidentiality and improper use.<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22"><sup>[22]</sup></a> Online legal platforms and AI providers often do not clearly disclose whether, and to what extent, they may reuse retained data, raising concerns about the potential use of client information.<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23"><sup>[23]</sup></a> In addition, legal data such as court decisions or contracts in full-text format are particularly difficult to anonymize effectively. Even when anonymization is promised or applied, contextual elements may still allow the identification of the clients or entities involved.<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24"><sup>[24]</sup></a>

Considering the above, it is essential for those who intend to use AI systems in arbitration proceedings &#8211; whether lawyers relying on them to draft pleadings or arbitrators using them for case management support &#8211; to carefully select their AI service providers. This helps ensure that confidentiality is respected and data is properly protected, avoiding any breach of professional secrecy.<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25"><sup>[25]</sup></a>

<strong>2.4 Risks related to automated decision-making</strong>

Finally, to complete this overview of critical issues surrounding the use of AI in arbitration, we turn to the risks linked to the potential use of AI by arbitrators in the decision-making process. As discussed above, this possibility may become increasingly common in the future.

At the same time, it is essential to recognize that the role of the arbitrator must comply with specific ethical standards, including independence, impartiality, competence, and the duty to ensure the enforceability of awards.<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26"><sup>[26]</sup></a> The improper use of AI-based systems by arbitrators to assist in their decision-making process could undermine these principles and may provide grounds for challenging the award.<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27"><sup>[27]</sup></a>

In this regard, a key consideration is the <em>intuitu personae</em> nature of the arbitral mandate, which requires that the assigned functions be performed directly by the arbitrator.<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28"><sup>[28]</sup></a> Where delegation does occur &#8211; for example, through the appointment of a tribunal secretary &#8211; it must be disclosed to the parties in advance.<a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29"><sup>[29]</sup></a> Thus, legitimate concerns have been raised as to whether it is appropriate for an arbitrator to delegate activities related to the decision-making function to an AI system or software.<a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30"><sup>[30]</sup></a>

Under French law, for instance, only a natural person with full legal capacity may act as an arbitrator.<a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31"><sup>[31]</sup></a>  Similarly, under Italian law, “<em>no person who lacks, in whole or in part, the legal capacity to act may be an arbitrator</em>”.<a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32"><sup>[32]</sup></a> In addition, case law in the context of AI-assisted patent registration has established that AI systems cannot be considered natural persons.<a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33"><sup>[33]</sup></a> Consequently, delegating adjudicative functions to an AI system could violate this requirement<a href="#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34"><sup>[34]</sup></a> and potentially lead to a challenge of the award.<a href="#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35"><sup>[35]</sup></a>

In addition, it is worth noting that the New York Convention, which governs the enforcement of arbitral awards across many jurisdictions, provides under Article V that enforcement may be refused if the arbitration procedure was not conducted in accordance with the parties’ agreement or the law of the seat. Accordingly, the use of AI in the decision-making process, without party consent or in breach of applicable procedural law, could also risk refusal of enforcement under such Convention.<a href="#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36"><sup>[36]</sup></a>

A further issue concerns the alleged inability of AI systems &#8211; at least at this stage of technological development &#8211; to produce adequately reasoned legal decisions.<a href="#_ftn37" name="_ftnref37"><sup>[37]</sup></a> Reasoning, which involves explaining the logical and legal grounds on which a decision is based, is a cornerstone of legal decision-making. This limitation represents a significant obstacle to the adoption of AI in arbitration.<a href="#_ftn38" name="_ftnref38"><sup>[38]</sup></a>

In light of these considerations, the use of AI systems in the decision-making process remains particularly problematic. It is thus essential that arbitrators and the parties involved agree on strict criteria governing the possible use of AI systems, to ensure compliance with the principles of independence, impartiality, and transparency throughout the arbitration process, thereby avoiding uncertainty and potential disputes.

In this context, a key question emerges: should parties be informed when arbitrators or lawyers make use of AI during legal proceedings? This is an issue that will need to be addressed in the near future.<a href="#_ftn39" name="_ftnref39"><sup>[39]</sup></a>
<ol start="3">
 	<li><strong>Emerging regulatory approaches on this issue</strong></li>
</ol>
Precisely for the reasons outlined above, arbitral institutions are beginning to adapt to the introduction of artificial intelligence in arbitration proceedings.

On 30 April 2024, the Silicon Valley Arbitration and Mediation Center (“<strong>SVAMC</strong>”) published the first edition of its “<em>Guidelines on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Arbitration</em>” (“<strong>Guidelines</strong>”). This was the first example of an arbitration institution incorporating AI provisions into its rules.<a href="#_ftn40" name="_ftnref40"><sup>[40]</sup></a>

The Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (“<strong>JAMS</strong>”), one of the leading providers of alternative dispute resolution services, also began adapting to the emergence of AI systems in arbitration proceedings. On 23 April 2024 &#8211; around the same time as the SVAMC&#8217;s Guideline &#8211; it issued the “<em>Rules Governing Disputes Involving Artificial Intelligence Systems</em>”, a set of provisions specifically designed to regulate disputes arising from the use of AI systems.<a href="#_ftn41" name="_ftnref41">[41]</a>

In October 2024, the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (“<strong>SCC</strong>”) issued a guide dedicated to the use of artificial intelligence in arbitration proceedings conducted under its rules. The document sets out guidelines aimed at ensuring that the adoption of AI technologies does not compromise the integrity and impartiality of the arbitral process.<a href="#_ftn42" name="_ftnref42"><sup>[42]</sup></a>

Despite the differences and specific features of the individual sources cited, some common principles emerge, reflecting the risks outlined above.

First, human oversight remains central to all three institutions (see Section 2.2 above). Under no circumstances may final decisions be delegated to AI. Arbitrators are permitted to use such systems only for support activities, such as factual analysis or document management, while remaining responsible for verifying their accuracy and fully accountable for the results produced.

Transparency is another shared pillar (see Section 2.4 above), although with some variation. The SCC requires arbitrators to disclose any use of AI, enabling parties to be informed and, if necessary, to object. The SVAMC adopts a more flexible approach, leaving the decision to the discretion of the arbitral tribunal, depending on the circumstances of the case. JAMS, on the other hand, has introduced specific protocols to ensure that AI-generated outcomes are accessible and subject to review by all parties.

Finally, all three sets of rules place particular emphasis on data protection, confidentiality, and security (see Section 2.3 above). Each Institution requires that AI systems comply with the highest standards of data protection and anonymization, and mandates verification of data storage and management policies.

It is therefore likely that, following these initial efforts, more arbitral institutions will soon begin developing frameworks to regulate the use of AI systems in the proceedings they administer, in order to remain aligned with technological developments.<a href="#_ftn43" name="_ftnref43">[43]</a>
<ol start="4">
 	<li><strong>Conclusion and recommendations</strong></li>
</ol>
In conclusion, artificial intelligence presents significant opportunities to enhance efficiency in international arbitration over the long term, creating new possibilities for optimizing time and resources. However, these innovations also introduce novel risks that require careful regulation and oversight by both arbitrators and legal practitioners.

As a result, an increasing number of arbitral institutions are progressively developing guidelines to support the responsible use of AI.

Looking ahead, collaboration among technology developers, arbitral institutions, and legal professionals will be essential to fully harness the potential of AI, helping to shape an arbitration process that is safer, more accessible, and better tailored to the needs of the parties involved.

In the meantime, while this regulatory landscape continues to evolve, we offer the following recommendations for the safe and effective use of AI in arbitration:

1) prioritise AI systems with transparent processes and regularly assess the risks and critical issues associated with their use.

2) Ensure that AI systems are updated with current data and carefully review the outputs they generate.

3) Select AI technology providers with care, verifying that they comply with strict data protection standards and applicable regulations.

4) Discuss and agree on the use of AI with clients, parties and arbitrators and clearly define how it will be integrated into the proceedings.

5) When acting as an arbitrator, always retain full decision-making authority, using AI solely as a support tool and ensuring that its use is disclosed to and accepted by the parties.

<hr />

&nbsp;


<div style="font-size: 10px;">

<a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a>      Janine Haesler/Tim Isler, <em>Navigating the Main Impacts of Artificial Intelligence in International Arbitration: Insights from the ICC YAAF Workshop</em>, in <em>Kluwer Arbitration Blog</em>, 17 March 2024 (https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2024/03/17/navigating-the-main-impacts-of-artificial-intelligence-in-international-arbitration-insights-from-the-icc-yaaf-workshop/).

<a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a>      Leonardo F. Souza-McMurtrie<em>, Arbitration Tech Toolbox: Will ChatGPT Change International Arbitration as We Know It?, in Kluwer Arbitration Blog</em>, 26 February 2023 (https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2023/02/26/arbitration-tech-toolbox-will-chatgpt-change-international-arbitration-as-we-know-it/).

<a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a>      Martina Magnarelli, <em>Cogito ergo (intelligens) sum? </em><em>Artificial Intelligence and international arbitration: who would set out the rules of the game? </em>Iurgium, volume 2022, number 43, p. 31 ff., para. 10; Janine Haesler/Tim Isler, <em>Navigating the Main Impacts of Artificial Intelligence in International Arbitration: Insights from the ICC YAAF Workshop, in Kluwer Arbitration Blog</em>, 17 March 2024 (https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2024/03/17/navigating-the-main-impacts-of-artificial-intelligence-in-international-arbitration-insights-from-the-icc-yaaf-workshop/).

<a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a>      Martina Magnarelli, <em>Cogito ergo (intelligens) sum? </em><em>Artificial Intelligence and international arbitration: who would set out the rules of the game? </em>Iurgium, volume 2022, number 43, p. 31 ff., para. 12.

<a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a>      Janine Haesler/Tim Isler, <em>Navigating the Main Impacts of Artificial Intelligence in International Arbitration: Insights from the ICC YAAF Workshop, in Kluwer Arbitration Blog</em>, 17 March 2024 (https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2024/03/17/navigating-the-main-impacts-of-artificial-intelligence-in-international-arbitration-insights-from-the-icc-yaaf-workshop/).

<a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a>      Janine Haesler/Tim Isler, <em>Navigating the Main Impacts of Artificial Intelligence in International Arbitration: Insights from the ICC YAAF Workshop, in Kluwer Arbitration Blog</em>, 17 March 2024 (https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2024/03/17/navigating-the-main-impacts-of-artificial-intelligence-in-international-arbitration-insights-from-the-icc-yaaf-workshop/).

<a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a>      Leonardo F. Souza-McMurtrie, <em>Arbitration Tech Toolbox: Will ChatGPT Change International Arbitration as We Know It?, in Kluwer Arbitration Blog</em>, 26 February 2023 (https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2023/02/26/arbitration-tech-toolbox-will-chatgpt-change-international-arbitration-as-we-know-it/).

<a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a>      Leonardo F. Souza-McMurtrie<em>, Arbitration Tech Toolbox: Will ChatGPT Change International Arbitration as We Know It? in Kluwer Arbitration Blog</em>, 26 February 2023 (https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2023/02/26/arbitration-tech-toolbox-will-chatgpt-change-international-arbitration-as-we-know-it/).

<a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a>      For instance, the Frankfurt Regional Court developed an AI tool called <em>Frankfurter Urteils-Konfigurator elektronisch</em> (FRaUKe) to assist judges in managing air passenger rights cases (https://hessen.de/presse/hessen-und-brandenburg-kooperieren-beim-ki-projekt-frauke). Similarly, the Stuttgart Court of Appeals introduced a project named <em>Oberlandesgerichtsassistent</em> (OLGA) to support the handling of mass litigation arising from the Diesel emissions scandal (https://de.newsroom.ibm.com/2022-12-07-OLG-Stuttgart-pilotiert-IBM-Massenverfahrensassistenten-zur-Fallbearbeitung-in-Dieselabgasverfahren).

<a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a>    Maxi Scherer, <em>Artificial Intelligence and Legal Decision-Making: The Wide Open? Study on the Example of International Arbitration, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper </em>No. 318/2019, p. 22 ff.

<a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a>    Maxi Scherer, <em>Artificial Intelligence and Legal Decision-Making: The Wide Open? Study on the Example of International Arbitration, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper </em>No. 318/2019, p. 19; Mahnoor Waqar, <em>The Use of AI in Arbitral Proceedings, in Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution</em>, 2022, volume 37, number 3, p. 343f.

<a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a>    Maxi Scherer, <em>Artificial Intelligence and Legal Decision-Making: The Wide Open? Study on the Example of International Arbitration, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper </em>No. 318/2019, pp. 22f., 31.

<a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">[13]</a>    Maxi Scherer, <em>Artificial Intelligence and Legal Decision-Making: The Wide Open? Study on the Example of International Arbitration, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper </em>No. 318/2019, pp. 22f., 31; <em>Silicon Valley Arbitration &amp; Mediation Center, Guidelines on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Arbitration</em>, Commentary to Guideline 1, p. 16.

<a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14">[14]</a>    Janine Haesler/Tim Isler, <em>Navigating the Main Impacts of Artificial Intelligence in International Arbitration: Insights from the ICC YAAF Workshop, in Kluwer Arbitration Blog</em>, 17 March 2024 (https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2024/03/17/navigating-the-main-impacts-of-artificial-intelligence-in-international-arbitration-insights-from-the-icc-yaaf-workshop/); Martina Magnarelli, <em>Cogito ergo (intelligens) sum? Artificial Intelligence and international arbitration: who would set out the rules of the game? </em>Iurgium, volume 2022, number 43, p. 31 ff., para. 10.

<a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15">[15]</a>    Crenguta Leaua/Corina Tănase, <em>Artificial Intelligence and Arbitration: Some Considerations on the Eve of a Global Regulation, </em>in Revista Română de Arbitraj, 2023, volume 17, number 4, pp. 31 ff.

<a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16">[16]</a>    <em>Silicon Valley Arbitration &amp; Mediation Center, Guidelines on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Arbitration</em>, Commentary on Guideline 1, p. 16.

<a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17">[17]</a>    See https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattnovak/2023/05/27/lawyer-uses-chatgpt-in-federal-court-and-it-goes-horribly-wrong/.

<a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18">[18]</a>    See<a href="https://www.advokatbladet.no/hoyesterett-kunstig-intelligens/hoyesterett-har-mottatt-sitt-forste-prosesskriv-med-oppdiktede-kilder/227171"> https://www.advokatbladet.no/hoyesterett-kunstig-intelligens/hoyesterett-har-mottatt-sitt-forste-prosesskriv-med-oppdiktede-kilder/227171 ;</a><a href="https://www.domstol.no/globalassets/upload/hret/internett/advokatveiledningen/advokatveiledningen-april-2025.pdf"> https://www.domstol.no/globalassets/upload/hret/internett/advokatveiledningen/advokatveiledningen-april-2025.pdf . </a>

<a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19">[19]</a>    Crenguta Leaua/Corina Tănase, <em>Artificial Intelligence and Arbitration: Some Considerations on the Eve of a Global Regulation</em>, in Revista Română de Arbitraj, 2023, volume 17, number 4, pp. 31 ff.

<a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20">[20]</a>    <em>Silicon Valley Arbitration &amp; Mediation Center, Guidelines on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Arbitration</em>, Commentary on Guideline 1, p. 16.

<a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21">[21]</a>    Art. 13 of the Italian Code of Legal Ethics.

<a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22">[22]</a>        <em>Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, Guide on the use of Artificial Intelligence-based tools by lawyers and law firms in the EU</em>, 2022, p. 47, 51.

<a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23">[23]</a>    <em>Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, Guide on the use of Artificial Intelligence-based tools by lawyers and law firms in the EU</em>, 2022, p. 48.

<a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24">[24]</a>    Moreover, the safeguards provided by the GDPR do not necessarily address in a comprehensive manner the risks associated with the use of artificial intelligence-based systems (Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, <em>Guide on the Use of Artificial Intelligence-Based Tools by Lawyers and Law Firms in the EU</em>, 2022, p. 48). The growing use of such systems also introduces an additional risk concerning the extraterritorial application of the GDPR. In particular, when cloud service providers &#8211; commonly used in AI applications &#8211; are subject to local regulations outside the scope of the GDPR, users may lose control over how those rules affect the protection of personal data in the context of legal proceedings (ibid., p. 44).

<a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25">[25]</a> <em>   Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, Guide on the use of Artificial Intelligence-based tools by lawyers and law firms in the EU</em>, 2022, p. 51; <em>Silicon Valley Arbitration &amp; Mediation Center, Guidelines on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Arbitration</em>, Commentary to Guideline 2, p. 17.

<a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26">[26]</a>    Juan Perla, <em>A Closer Look at the New SVAMC Guidelines for AI in International Arbitration</em>, 23 May 2024 (https://aria.law.columbia.edu/a-closer-look-at-the-new-svamc-guidelines-for-ai-in-international-arbitration/#:~:text=Guidelines%20for%20Arbitrators,-Arbitrators%20are%20subject&amp;text=While%20arbitrators%20may%20use%20AI,instructed%20to%20verify%20their%20veracity).

<a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27">[27]</a>    Juan Perla, <em>A Closer Look at the New SVAMC Guidelines for AI in International Arbitration</em>, 23 May 2024 (https://aria.law.columbia.edu/a-closer-look-at-the-new-svamc-guidelines-for-ai-in-international-arbitration/#:~:text=Guidelines%20for%20Arbitrators,-Arbitrators%20are%20subject&amp;text=While%20arbitrators%20may%20use%20AI,instructed%20to%20verify%20their%20veracity).

<a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28">[28]</a>    Claire Morel de Westgaver, <em>Canvassing Views on AI in AI: The Rise of Machine Learning, in Kluwer Arbitration Blog</em>, 12 July 2023 (https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2023/07/12/canvassing-views-on-ai-in-ia-the-rise-of-machine-learning/); Crenguta Leaua/Corina Tănase, <em>Artificial Intelligence and Arbitration: Some Considerations on the Eve of a Global Regulation</em>, in Revista Română de Arbitraj, 2023, volume 17, number 4, pp. 31 ff.

<a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29">[29]</a>    Claire Morel de Westgaver, <em>Canvassing Views on AI in AI: The Rise of Machine Learning, in Kluwer Arbitration Blog, </em>12 July 2023 (https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2023/07/12/canvassing-views-on-ai-in-ia-the-rise-of-machine-learning/).

<a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30">[30]</a>    Claire Morel de Westgaver<em>, Canvassing Views on AI in AI: The Rise of Machine Learning, in Kluwer Arbitration Blog</em>, 12 July 2023 (https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2023/07/12/canvassing-views-on-ai-in-ia-the-rise-of-machine-learning/).

<a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31">[31]</a>    Art. 1450 of the French Code of Civil Procedure: <em>&#8220;La mission d&#8217;arbitre ne peut être exercée que par une personne physique jouissant du plein exercice de ses droits.&#8221;</em>

<a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32">[32]</a>    Art. 812 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure.

<a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33">[33]</a>    <em>United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</em>, Stephen Thaler v. Katherine K. Vidal, <em>Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Case </em>No. 2021-2347, 5 August 2022.

<a href="#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34">[34]</a>    Juan Perla, <em>A Closer Look at the New SVAMC Guidelines for AI in International Arbitration</em>, 23 May 2024 (https://aria.law.columbia.edu/a-closer-look-at-the-new-svamc-guidelines-for-ai-in-international-arbitration/#:~:text=Guidelines%20for%20Arbitrators,-Arbitrators%20are%20subject&amp;text=While%20arbitrators%20may%20use%20AI,instructed%20to%20verify%20their%20veracity).

<a href="#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35">[35]</a>    Juan Perla, <em>A Closer Look at the New SVAMC Guidelines for AI in International Arbitration</em>, 23 May 2024 (https://aria.law.columbia.edu/a-closer-look-at-the-new-svamc-guidelines-for-ai-in-international-arbitration/#:~:text=Guidelines%20for%20Arbitrators,-Arbitrators%20are%20subject&amp;text=While%20arbitrators%20may%20use%20AI,instructed%20to%20verify%20their%20veracity); Crenguta Leaua/Corina Tănase, <em>Artificial Intelligence and Arbitration: Some Considerations on the Eve of a Global Regulation</em>, in Revista Română de Arbitraj, 2023, volume 17, number 4, pp. 31 ff, p. 38.

<a href="#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36">[36]</a>    Juan Perla, <em>A Closer Look at the New SVAMC Guidelines for AI in International Arbitration</em>, 23 May 2024 <a href="https://aria.law.columbia.edu/a-closer-look-at-the-new-svamc-guidelines-for-ai-in-international-arbitration/#:~:text=Guidelines%20for%20Arbitrators,-Arbitrators%20are%20subject&amp;text=While%20arbitrators%20may%20use%20AI,instructed%20to%20verify%20their%20veracity">(</a>https://aria.law.columbia.edu/a-closer-look-at-the-new-svamc-guidelines-for-ai-in-international-arbitration/#:~:text=Guidelines%20for%20Arbitrators,-Arbitrators%20are%20subject&amp;text=While%20arbitrators%20may%20use%20AI,instructed%20to%20verify%20their%20veracity). It should be noted, however, that while not explicitly mentioning the use of AI, some authors point out that the 1958 New York Convention could not foresee such an eventuality, thus making the issue particularly interesting (see in more detail the analysis by Annabelle O. Onyefulu<em>, Artificial Intelligence in International Arbitration: A Step Too Far?, in The International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management</em>, p. 56 ff., p. 60 ff., with further references).

<a href="#_ftnref37" name="_ftn37">[37]</a>    Maxi Scherer, <em>Artificial Intelligence and Legal Decision-Making: The Wide Open? Study on the Example of International Arbitration, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper </em>No. 318/2019, p. 22.

<a href="#_ftnref38" name="_ftn38">[38]</a>    See in more detail Maxi Scherer, <em>Artificial Intelligence and Legal Decision-Making: The Wide Open? Study on the Example of International Arbitration, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper </em>No. 318/2019, p. 22 ff.

<a href="#_ftnref39" name="_ftn39">[39]</a>    Claire Morel de Westgaver, <em>Canvassing Views on AI in AI: The Rise of Machine Learning, in Kluwer Arbitration Blog, </em>12 July 2023 (https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2023/07/12/canvassing-views-on-ai-in-ia-the-rise-of-machine-learning/).

<a href="#_ftnref40" name="_ftn40">[40]</a>    <em>Silicon Valley Arbitration &amp; Mediation Center, Guidelines on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Arbitration, </em>p. 8 (&#8220;<em>computer systems that perform tasks commonly associated with human cognition, such as understanding natural language, recognising complex semantic patterns, and generating human-like outputs</em>&#8220;). Specifically, the <em>Guidelines </em>define artificial intelligence as &#8220;<em>computer systems that perform tasks commonly associated with human cognition, such as understanding natural language, recognising complex semantic patterns, and generating human-like outputs</em>&#8220;.

<a href="#_ftnref41" name="_ftn41">[41]</a> <em>Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Artificial Intelligence Disputes Clause and Rules, Section 1, p. 1 ff.</em>

<a href="#_ftnref42" name="_ftn42">[42]</a>  <em> Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce </em>(SCC), <em>Guide to the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Cases Administered Under the SCC Rules</em>, Section &#8216;<em>AI and its uses</em>&#8216;, p. 1 ff.

<a href="#_ftnref43" name="_ftn43">[43]</a>                                                  In this regard, it should be noted that both the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIArb) and the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) of the AAA have more recently issued guidance documents on the use of AI in arbitration proceedings, with CIArb publishing its guideline in March 2025 and ICDR following in April 2025.

</div><p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/09/international-arbitration-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence-opportunities-and-emerging-challenges/">INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: OPPORTUNITIES AND EMERGING CHALLENGES</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
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		<title>FROM ACQUISITION TO DEPLOYMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS: OBLIGATIONS AND COMPLIANCE UNDER THE AI ACT AND THE GDPR &#8211; 17 July 2025</title>
		<link>https://www.dejalex.com/2025/07/from-acquisition-to-deployment-of-artificial-intelligence-systems-obligations-and-compliance-under-the-ai-act-and-the-gdpr-17-july-2025/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[team valletta]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2025 11:13:25 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Alessandro Foti]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Armando Ambrosio]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Digital/Tech]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jacopo Piemonte]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Massimo Caiazza]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dejalex.com/?p=31645</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />[x_icon type="calendar"] 17 July 2025[br]<br />
[x_icon type="user"] Alessandro Foti, Jacopo Piemonte, Armando Ambrosio e Massimo Caiazza</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/07/from-acquisition-to-deployment-of-artificial-intelligence-systems-obligations-and-compliance-under-the-ai-act-and-the-gdpr-17-july-2025/">FROM ACQUISITION TO DEPLOYMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS: OBLIGATIONS AND COMPLIANCE UNDER THE AI ACT AND THE GDPR – 17 July 2025</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p data-start="0" data-end="356">On the occasion of the webinar organized by our Firm in collaboration with the Italian-Swedish Chamber of Commerce Assosvezia, several key aspects related to the adoption of artificial intelligence systems in companies were explored together with Alessandro Foti, Jacopo Piemonte, Ugo Romano (CEO of Dyna Brains), Armando Ambrosio, and Massimo Caiazza.</p>
<p data-start="358" data-end="634" data-is-last-node="" data-is-only-node="">In particular, the discussion focused on:</p>
<ul>
<li data-start="358" data-end="634">Strategies and roadmaps to reduce risks and create value</li>
<li data-start="358" data-end="634">Contracts, policies, and governance for responsible AI use</li>
<li data-start="358" data-end="634">The interplay between the AI Act and GDPR, with a focus on practical implications for developers and users</li>
</ul>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/07/from-acquisition-to-deployment-of-artificial-intelligence-systems-obligations-and-compliance-under-the-ai-act-and-the-gdpr-17-july-2025/">FROM ACQUISITION TO DEPLOYMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS: OBLIGATIONS AND COMPLIANCE UNDER THE AI ACT AND THE GDPR &#8211; 17 July 2025</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
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		<title>THE ITALIAN DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY HAS ISSUED A SANCTIONING DECISION REGARDING THE PROCESSING OF EMPLOYEES’ METADATA</title>
		<link>https://www.dejalex.com/2025/06/the-italian-data-protection-authority-has-issued-a-sanctioning-decision-regarding-the-processing-of-employees-metadata/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[team valletta]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Jun 2025 09:30:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Adriano Garofalo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Data Protection and Cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Employment and Pensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU and Competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaspare Roma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jacopo Piemonte]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Litigation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Marco Stillo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Publications]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dejalex.com/?p=31591</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />The article by Gaspare Roma, Jacopo Piemonte, Adriano Garofalo e Marco Stillo on Lexology</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/06/the-italian-data-protection-authority-has-issued-a-sanctioning-decision-regarding-the-processing-of-employees-metadata/">THE ITALIAN DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY HAS ISSUED A SANCTIONING DECISION REGARDING THE PROCESSING OF EMPLOYEES’ METADATA</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p><strong>I</strong>n a precedent-setting decision, on 29 April 2025 the Italian Data Protection Authority (“Garante della privacy”) issued its first sanction under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) for the unlawful storage of so-called “metadata” of employees&#8217; e-mails and web surfing activities, applying for the first time the Guidelines published in June 2024.</p>
<p>As part of the inspections carried out in order to assess the compliance of the processing operations carried out at work by the Regione Lombardia (the regional government of Lombardy) with the rules on the protection of personal data, the Garante had found that the latter had kept metadata and navigation logs for 90 and 365 days respectively, a period of time far longer than that provided for by the Guidelines. Moreover, the Regione Lombardia had kept non-anonymous logs relating to each employee&#8217;s access attempts to websites listed on a blacklist. As a result, the Garante started proceedings against the Regione Lombardia given that that the processing of the data concerned was contrary: to i) the sector regulations on remote control with regard to the storage of metadata generated by the activities of employees in relation to both the use of the e-mail service and internet browsing; ii) the conditions laid down by the sector regulations with regard to the use of the metadata collected for other purposes connected with the management of the employment relationship; and iii) the storage periods of the logs relating to internet browsing as well as the data relating to requests for technical assistance.</p>
<p>The Garante has preliminarily recalled that e-mails’ metadata are backed by confidentiality guarantees, which are also constitutionally protected, and are intended to ensure protection of the essential core of a person’s dignity and the full development of his/her personality in social settings, so that, even at work, there is a legitimate expectation of confidentiality with regard to correspondence and, similarly, to the elements that can be inferred from the external data thereof, which define its temporal profiles as well as its qualitative and quantitative aspects also with regard to the addressees and the frequency of contact (which, in turn, are susceptible to aggregation, processing and control). The Workers&#8217; Statute, moreover, strictly identifies the purposes for which instruments may be used at work, establishing precise procedural guarantees.</p>
<p>Although the Regione Lombardia claimed that electronic e-mails were used by the employee to work, such notion within the meaning of the Workers&#8217; Statute can only include services, software or applications that are strictly functional to the latter. This, however, is not the case where e-mail’s metadata are collected and stored, in a preventive and generalised manner, over an extended period by computer programmes and services for managing e-mails. Such processing operations, in fact, are carried out, for the employer&#8217;s own needs, automatically and independently of the employee&#8217;s perception and will. The metadata concerned, moreover, remain at the exclusive disposal of the employer and, on his/her behalf, of the service provider, documenting the traffic even after the possible deletion of the message by the worker who, instead, retains the availability of the messages that, as sender or recipient, he/she exchanges within the mailbox assigned to him/her by the employer, with the subsequent risk of an indirect remote control of the workers&#8217; activity.</p>
<p>In such a context, therefore, in order for Article 4(2) of the Workers&#8217; Statute to be deemed applicable, the collection and storage of only those metadata necessary to ensure the operation of the e-mail system infrastructure and the fulfilment of the most essential computer security guarantees, on the basis of technical assessments and in compliance with the principle of accountability, may be carried out for a period limited to a few days, in any case not exceeding 21, unless the data controller adequately shows that particular conditions that make such an extension necessary on account of the specificities of his/her technical and organisational reality are actually present. Conversely, the generalised collection and storage of e-mail’s metadata, for a longer period, in the presence of requirements in any case attributable to the security and protection of the employer&#8217;s assets, makes it necessary to exercise the guarantees provided for by Article 4(1) of the Statute, since it may entail an indirect remote control of the workers&#8217; activities.</p>
<p>The systematic collection and storage of all log files generated by employees’ use of the Internet in the context of the employment relationship gives rise to a generalized processing of data. This includes data on unsuccessful attempts to access websites already listed on a blacklist, which are in any case blocked by the system.</p>
<p>Since employees remain identifiable, and there is a clear link between the activity, the employee, and their specific workstation, such processing makes it possible to reconstruct their actions through technological systems.</p>
<p>In these cases, the employer must comply with the procedural safeguards set out in Article 4(1) of the Workers’ Statute. These safeguards are a legal requirement for the lawful processing of the data in question.</p>
<p>Given that the Regione Lombardia had collected and processed all the employee&#8217;s internet surfing logs in the absence of the prior conclusion of a collective agreement with the competent trade unions, the processing at stake therefore took place, within the limits of that timeframe, in breach of the GDPR.</p>
<p>All of that considered, the Garante decided, on the one hand, to sanction the Regione Lombardia with a EUR 50,000 fine and, on the other hand, to order it, among other things, to limit the storage of navigation logs to 90 days and then proceed to anonymisation, to minimise and encrypt e-mail’s metadata, to limit access to metadata to authorised personnel only, and to update internal policies and privacy documentation.</p>
<p>In light of the Garante&#8217;s findings, companies are called upon to review their metadata and network log management practices very carefully. Even before the decision, a high level of caution was needed in the handling of e-mails, requiring, for example, transparency on the checks carried out and the timely deletion of the boxes of terminated employees. The recent sanction introduces a further level of caution, extending the compliance obligation also to so-called “external” data, such as metadata and log files, which can lead to indirect monitoring of work activity. In this regard, e-mail’s metadata should normally be retained for no longer than 21 days, while browsing logs should be limited to 90 days, followed by anonymisation. It is also crucial to update privacy notices, limit data access, encrypt data and adopt consistent internal policies. Only a structured and compliant approach can guarantee the protection of workers&#8217; rights and corporate compliance and avoid significant consequences for the organisation, including with regard to sanctions by the competent authorities, as demonstrated by this case.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Articolo_The-Italian-Data-Protection-Authority-has-issued-a-sanctioning-decision-regarding-the-processing-of-employees-metadata.pdf"><i  class="x-icon x-icon-download" data-x-icon-s="&#xf019;" aria-hidden="true"></i> Download the article</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/06/the-italian-data-protection-authority-has-issued-a-sanctioning-decision-regarding-the-processing-of-employees-metadata/">THE ITALIAN DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY HAS ISSUED A SANCTIONING DECISION REGARDING THE PROCESSING OF EMPLOYEES’ METADATA</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
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		<title>EUROPEAN REGULATION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI ACT): WHERE DO WE STAND? – 8 May 2025</title>
		<link>https://www.dejalex.com/2025/05/european-regulation-on-artificial-intelligence-ai-act-where-do-we-stand-8-may-2025/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[team valletta]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 08 May 2025 13:19:20 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Alessandro Foti]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Armando Ambrosio]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Digital/Tech]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fabio Ferraro]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jacopo Piemonte]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Silvia Bolognani]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dejalex.com/?p=31286</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />[x_icon type="map-marker"] Milan, Online [br]<br />
[x_icon type="calendar"] 8 May 2025[br]<br />
[x_icon type="user"] Alessandro Foti, Jacopo Piemonte, Fabio Ferraro, Armando Ambrosio</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/05/european-regulation-on-artificial-intelligence-ai-act-where-do-we-stand-8-may-2025/">EUROPEAN REGULATION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI ACT): WHERE DO WE STAND? – 8 May 2025</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p class="" data-start="132" data-end="371">On Thursday, May 8, we hosted the event <strong data-start="132" data-end="254">“European Regulation on Artificial Intelligence (AI Act): Where Do We Stand?</strong>”<strong data-start="132" data-end="254">,</strong> organized by our Firm in collaboration with the <strong>Italian-Swedish Chamber of Commerce Assosvezia</strong> and <strong>Horizon Security</strong>.</p>
<p class="" data-start="373" data-end="618">Speakers <strong>Alessandro Foti</strong>, <strong>Jacopo Piemonte</strong>, <strong>Massimiliano Luraghi</strong>, <strong>Fabio Ferraro </strong>and <strong>Armando Ambrosio</strong> explored the main aspects of the AI Act, with a particular focus on the obligations and prohibitions already in force under the regulation.</p>
<p class="" data-start="620" data-end="647"><strong data-start="620" data-end="647">Two key thematic areas:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li data-start="649" data-end="773"><em data-start="652" data-end="671">Technical aspects</em>: A closer look at how AI systems actually work, with insights from our partners at @Horizon Security.</li>
<li data-start="775" data-end="960"><em data-start="778" data-end="801">Regulatory compliance</em>: A deep dive into the obligations and prohibitions already in effect, which companies should have already started integrating into their compliance processes.</li>
</ul>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone  wp-image-31290" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250508_172051.jpg" alt="" width="399" height="299" srcset="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250508_172051.jpg 2560w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250508_172051-300x225.jpg 300w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250508_172051-1024x768.jpg 1024w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250508_172051-768x576.jpg 768w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250508_172051-1536x1152.jpg 1536w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250508_172051-2048x1536.jpg 2048w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250508_172051-100x75.jpg 100w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250508_172051-862x647.jpg 862w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250508_172051-1200x900.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 399px) 100vw, 399px" /> <img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone  wp-image-31294" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/IMG-20250508-WA0006.jpg" alt="" width="400" height="300" srcset="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/IMG-20250508-WA0006.jpg 2048w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/IMG-20250508-WA0006-300x225.jpg 300w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/IMG-20250508-WA0006-1024x768.jpg 1024w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/IMG-20250508-WA0006-768x576.jpg 768w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/IMG-20250508-WA0006-1536x1152.jpg 1536w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/IMG-20250508-WA0006-100x75.jpg 100w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/IMG-20250508-WA0006-862x647.jpg 862w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/IMG-20250508-WA0006-1200x900.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 400px) 100vw, 400px" /></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/05/european-regulation-on-artificial-intelligence-ai-act-where-do-we-stand-8-may-2025/">EUROPEAN REGULATION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI ACT): WHERE DO WE STAND? – 8 May 2025</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
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		<title>AIJA PANEL AND BRUNCH AT THE VIS MOOT &#8211; Vienna, 15 April 2025</title>
		<link>https://www.dejalex.com/2025/04/aija-panel-and-brunch-at-the-vis-moot-vienna-15-april-2025/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[team valletta]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Apr 2025 19:11:50 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Arbitration and ADR]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jacopo Piemonte]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Michelangelo Cicogna]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dejalex.com/?p=31111</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />[x_icon type="map-marker"] Vienna[br]<br />
[x_icon type="calendar"] 15 April 2025[br]<br />
[x_icon type="user"] Michelangelo Cicogna, Jacopo Piemonte</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/04/aija-panel-and-brunch-at-the-vis-moot-vienna-15-april-2025/">AIJA PANEL AND BRUNCH AT THE VIS MOOT – Vienna, 15 April 2025</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p>On April 15th, <strong>Michelangelo Cicogna</strong> joined the <strong>AIJA Panel and Brunch </strong>at the<strong> Vis Moot</strong> <strong>in Vienna</strong> as a speaker, an event organized by <strong>AIJA &#8211; International Association of Young Lawyers</strong>.</p>
<p>The panel sparked an engaging conversation around a key topic for any young arbitration practitioner: how to build and strengthen your professional profile in a competitive and ever-evolving field.</p>
<p>Michelangelo was glad to share the stage with friends and experienced practitioners (in different roles, private, in-house and institutional), offering practical insights on mentoring, networking, publications, speaking engagements and much more.</p>
<p>A warm thank you to AIJA and BINDER GRÖSSWANG Rechtsanwälte GmbH for the invitation, to fellow speakers <strong>Nadia Ohlhoff-Smahi</strong>, <strong>Kevin Nash</strong>, <strong>Chris Campbell</strong>, <strong>Marija Dobrić</strong> and <strong>Jacopo Piemonte</strong> for the inspiring exchange and to all the participants!</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/04/aija-panel-and-brunch-at-the-vis-moot-vienna-15-april-2025/">AIJA PANEL AND BRUNCH AT THE VIS MOOT &#8211; Vienna, 15 April 2025</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
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		<title>AI DRAFT LAW: LAWYERS EXPLAIN THE NEW RULES</title>
		<link>https://www.dejalex.com/2025/03/ai-draft-law-lawyers-explain-the-new-rules/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[team valletta]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Mar 2025 14:33:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Digital/Tech]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jacopo Piemonte]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Perspectives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dejalex.com/?p=31131</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />Jacopo Piemonte interviewed by Economy Magazine<br />
[br]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/03/ai-draft-law-lawyers-explain-the-new-rules/">AI DRAFT LAW: LAWYERS EXPLAIN THE NEW RULES</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p><div id="cs-content" class="cs-content"><div class="x-section e31131-e1 mo0r-0"><div class="x-div e31131-e2 mo0r-1"><div class="x-row e31131-e3 mo0r-3 mo0r-4"><div class="x-row-inner"><div class="x-col e31131-e4 mo0r-5 mo0r-6"><div class="x-div e31131-e5 mo0r-1 mo0r-2"><div class="x-text x-content e31131-e6 mo0r-8"><p><strong>Economy Magazine</strong> features an article analyzing the Artificial Intelligence Draft Law, approved by the Italian Senate on March 20, and now under review in the Chamber of Deputies. The draft law aims to complement the European AI Act by introducing a regulatory framework governing AI use across various sectors, with a strong focus on balancing technological progress and fundamental rights.</p></div><div class="x-text x-text-headline e31131-e7 mo0r-9"><div class="x-text-content"><div class="x-text-content-text">
<h3 class="x-text-content-text-primary">Among the interviewees is our <strong>Jacopo Piemonte</strong>, who emphasized: "<em>This draft law represents [...] an important safeguard for the protection of fundamental rights recognized by our society. [...] After the legislative process is completed, it will be crucial to ensure adequate funding for the authorities responsible for overseeing this regulation. Only in this way can we achieve effective enforcement of the law, ensuring that the key principles it enshrines are truly upheld.</em>"</h3></div></div></div><a class="x-anchor x-anchor-button has-graphic e31131-e8 mo0r-a mo0r-b" tabindex="0" href="https://www.economymagazine.it/ddl-intelligenza-artificiale-avvocati-spiegano-regole-arrivo/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><div class="x-anchor-content"><span class="x-graphic" aria-hidden="true"><i class="x-icon x-graphic-child x-graphic-icon x-graphic-primary" aria-hidden="true" data-x-icon-s="&#xf08e;"></i></span><div class="x-anchor-text"><span class="x-anchor-text-primary">READ THE FULL ARTICLE IN ITALIAN</span></div></div></a></div></div><div class="x-col e31131-e9 mo0r-5 mo0r-7"><a class="x-image e31131-e10 mo0r-d" href="https://www.dejalex.com/partner/jacopo-piemonte/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img decoding="async" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Jacopo-Piemonte-ppl.jpg" width="200" height="250" alt="Placeholder Image" loading="lazy"></a></div></div></div><a class="x-anchor x-anchor-button has-graphic e31131-e11 mo0r-b mo0r-c" tabindex="0" href="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/20250327-De-Berti-Jacchia-Rassegna-Economy-DDL-AI.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><div class="x-anchor-content"><span class="x-graphic" aria-hidden="true"><i class="x-icon x-graphic-child x-graphic-icon x-graphic-primary" aria-hidden="true" data-x-icon-s="&#xf08e;"></i></span><div class="x-anchor-text"><span class="x-anchor-text-primary">DOWNLOAD THE ARTICLE IN ITALIAN</span></div></div></a></div></div></div></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/03/ai-draft-law-lawyers-explain-the-new-rules/">AI DRAFT LAW: LAWYERS EXPLAIN THE NEW RULES</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
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		<title>LA CORTE DI CASSAZIONE SI PRONUNCIA SULL’UTILIZZO DEL WHISTLEBLOWING NELLE DENUNCE DI CARATTERE PERSONALE</title>
		<link>https://www.dejalex.com/2025/02/whistleblowing-denunce-personali-cassazione/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[marketude]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 21 Feb 2025 09:28:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Employment and Pensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaspare Roma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jacopo Piemonte]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Litigation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Marco Stillo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Publications]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dejalex.com/?p=30836</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />[x_icon type="tag"] Employment and Pensions, Litigation, Whistleblowing</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/02/whistleblowing-denunce-personali-cassazione/">LA CORTE DI CASSAZIONE SI PRONUNCIA SULL’UTILIZZO DEL WHISTLEBLOWING NELLE DENUNCE DI CARATTERE PERSONALE</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p>In data 27 gennaio 2025, la Sezione Lavoro della Corte di Cassazione si è pronunciata sul ricorso presentato nei confronti della Sentenza n. 72/2021 della Corte d’appello di Ancona relativa a dei provvedimenti di sospensione cautelare dal servizio e dalla retribuzione nonché sospensione con riferimento a due procedimenti disciplinari avviati dall’azienda ospedaliera &#8220;Ospedali Riuniti Marche Nord&#8221; (“ASUR Marche”) nei confronti di un suo dipendente.</p>
<p>La decisione della Corte è particolarmente rilevante in quanto verte altresì sull’utilizzo dell’istituto del c.d. “<em>whistleblowing</em>” e rappresenta, pertanto, uno dei primi provvedimenti dove si analizza l’utilizzo di tale canale in un’ottica giuslavoristica.</p>
<p>Più particolarmente, nell’ambito del primo procedimento (che è quello su cui ci concentreremo in questo articolo) veniva contestato al ricorrente di aver posto in essere comportamenti contrari all’articolo 55-quater, comma 1, lettera e), del D. Lgs. 165/2001<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup>[1]</sup></a>inviando due esposti alla Procura della Repubblica e rappresentando uno scenario privo di fondamento, abusando del proprio ufficio al fine di ledere l&#8217;onorabilità professionale del Direttore generale e della dirigenza. Nell’ambito del secondo procedimento disciplinare (i cui dettagli esponiamo solo per completezza), invece, veniva contestato all&#8217;appellante di aver tenuto comportamenti integranti il reato di falso materiale nel rilascio di copie autentiche ai sensi dell&#8217;articolo 478 del codice penale per avere rilasciato all&#8217;avvocato che rappresentava il ricorrente nel procedimento di opposizione al decreto ingiuntivo che era stato ottenuto per il pagamento degli onorari, di cui al primo procedimento disciplinare, una copia della determina di nomina del difensore fiduciario diversa dall&#8217;originale in quanto priva di sottoscrizione del Dirigente.</p>
<p>Dopo essere stati inizialmente sospesi, entrambi i procedimenti disciplinari erano stati successivamente riaperti ed erano stati giudicati dal Tribunale di Macerata, che aveva disposto la sospensione del ricorrente dal servizio e dalla retribuzione per 6 mesi. Quest’ultimo, pertanto, aveva proposto impugnazione dinnanzi alla Corte d’appello di Ancona, che tuttavia l’aveva respinta ritenendo, da un lato, che la sospensione fosse stata disposta in quanto pendeva nei suoi confronti un procedimento penale per falso connesso con i fatti per i quali si procedeva e, dall’altro, che le condotte contestate fossero effettivamente idonee a ledere l&#8217;immagine interna ed esterna della pubblica amministrazione (punto di interesse per questa analisi) nonché un regolare svolgimento dell&#8217;attività amministrativa. Di conseguenza, il ricorrente si era rivolto alla Corte di Cassazione deducendo <u>due motivi di ricorso</u>.</p>
<p>Con il <u>primo motivo di ricorso</u>, il ricorrente lamentava la violazione e falsa applicazione delle disposizioni normative e contrattuali che disciplinano i presupposti legittimanti l&#8217;adozione del provvedimento di sospensione cautelare. Tale primo motivo veniva accolto<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup>[2]</sup></a>(con conseguente cassazione della sentenza della Corte di appello).</p>
<p>Ai nostri fini, è particolarmente utile valutare però il <u>secondo motivo</u> che verteva sulla violazione e falsa applicazione dell’articolo 54 bis del D. Lgs. 165/2001. In particolare, tale disposizione intitolata “Tutela del dipendente pubblico che segnala illeciti”, al comma 1 disponeva: “&#8230; <em>Fuori dei casi di responsabilità a titolo di calunnia o diffamazione, ovvero per lo stesso titolo ai sensi dell&#8217;articolo 2043 del codice civile, il pubblico dipendente che denuncia all&#8217;autorità giudiziaria o alla Corte dei conti</em> <em>o all&#8217;Autorità nazionale anticorruzione (ANAC), ovvero riferisce al proprio superiore gerarchico condotte illecite di cui sia venuto a conoscenza in ragione del rapporto di lavoro, non può essere sanzionato, licenziato o sottoposto ad una misura discriminatoria, diretta o indiretta, avente effetti sulle condizioni di lavoro per motivi collegati direttamente o indirettamente alla denuncia&#8230;</em>”. Secondo il ricorrente, tale disciplina avrebbe dovuto trovare applicazione rispetto all’ASUR Marche e, di conseguenza, impedire che potesse essergli irrogata la sanzione disciplinare.</p>
<p>A riguardo, la Cassazione ha preliminarmente ricordato che l’istituto del <em>whistleblowing</em> trova la sua <em>ratio</em>, da un lato, nel delineare un particolare <em>status</em> giuslavoristico in favore del soggetto che segnala illeciti e, dall’altro, nel favorire l’emersione, dall’interno delle organizzazioni pubbliche, di fatti illeciti, promuovendo forme più incisive di contrasto alla corruzione, di talché un dipendente virtuoso non può essere sanzionato o sottoposto a misure discriminatorie aventi effetti sulle condizioni di lavoro per motivi collegati alla sanzione effettuata, che deve avere ad oggetto una condotta illecita, anche se non necessariamente rilevante a livello penale<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup>[3]</sup></a>.<u>L’istituto del <em>whistleblowing</em>, pertanto, non è utilizzabile per scopi essenzialmente di carattere personale o per contestazioni inerenti al rapporto di lavoro nei confronti di superiori</u><a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup>[4]</sup></a>, disciplinate da altre normative e procedure.</p>
<p>Ciò che, secondo la Cassazione, si verifica nel caso concreto, in quanto vi era un interesse personale nella presentazione delle denunce, dalle quali emergeva una doglianza relativa alla gestione di un contenzioso ASUR, in contrasto con le indicazioni che il ricorrente, in qualità di responsabile del procedimento, aveva fornito all’Amministrazione. Il secondo motivo di ricorso, pertanto, veniva respinto in quanto inammissibile.</p>
<p>In conclusione, questa pronuncia chiarisce con nettezza che <strong>l’istituto del <em>whistleblowing</em> non può essere strumentalizzato per finalità personali né utilizzato per risolvere controversie individuali con superiori o colleghi</strong>. La sentenza ribadisce, infatti, che le segnalazioni devono riguardare illeciti previsti dall’apposita normativa e non semplici lamentele relative al rapporto di lavoro. È fondamentale che le società sensibilizzino i dipendenti su questa distinzione, prevenendo usi impropri (e soprattutto strumentali) dello strumento e preservando il <em>whistleblowing </em>come canale per riportare irregolarità o violazioni di legge che possano arrecare danno all’interesse pubblico o all’integrità dell’ente o dell’organizzazione.</p>
<p>I principi di cui sopra, sebbene espressi nell’ambito di un rapporto di lavoro pubblico (dove le regole del <em>whistleblowing</em> sono entrate in vigore prima rispetto al settore privato), sembrano pacificamente applicabili anche nei rapporti di lavoro privati. Da ciò ne dovrebbe derivare una limitazione dell’uso improprio dello strumento in questione, sempre più spesso interpretato (dai lavoratori) quale strumento di tutela dei propri diritti squisitamente giuslavoristici, in luogo di uno strumento di repressione di condotte illecite aziendali non necessariamente legate al rapporto di lavoro in questione.</p>
<p class="has-text-align-center" style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Articolo_La-Corte-di-Cassazione-si-pronuncia-sullutilizzo-del-whistleblowing-nelle-denunce-di-carattere-personale.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><i  class="x-icon x-icon-download" data-x-icon-s="&#xf019;" aria-hidden="true"></i> Download Article</a></p>
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<p id="_ftn1">[1] Decreto legislativo 30 marzo 2001, n. 165, Norme generali sull&#8217;ordinamento del lavoro alle dipendenze delle amministrazioni pubbliche, GU n. 106 del 09.05.2001. L’articolo 55-quater del Decreto, intitolato “Licenziamento disciplinare”, al comma 1 lettera e) dispone: “<em>&#8230; Ferma la disciplina in tema di licenziamento per giusta causa o per giustificato motivo e salve ulteriori ipotesi previste dal contratto collettivo, si applica comunque la sanzione disciplinare del licenziamento nei seguenti casi:</em></p>
<p><em>(&#8230;)</em></p>
<p><em>e) reiterazione nell&#8217;ambiente di lavoro di gravi condotte aggressive o moleste o minacciose o ingiuriose o comunque lesive dell&#8217;onore e della dignità personale altrui&#8230;</em>”.</p>
<p id="_ftn2">[2] A tale riguardo, la Corte ha stabilito che la possibilità della sospensione facoltativa cautelare è subordinata alla pendenza di un procedimento penale a carico del lavoratore per gli stessi fatti per cui sia stato promosso il procedimento disciplinare. La pendenza del procedimento penale per gli stessi fatti contestati in sede disciplinare, inoltre, è elemento costitutivo del diritto riconosciuto al datore di lavoro, e non una mera condizione di efficacia, di talché l&#8217;esercizio del potere in difetto dei necessari presupposti richiesti dalla fonte contrattuale dà luogo ad un&#8217;invalidità dell&#8217;atto e non alla sua sola inefficacia temporanea.</p>
<p id="_ftn3">[3] Cassazione sentenza n. 17715/2024.</p>
<p id="_ftn4">[4] Consiglio di Stato sentenza n. 7002/2023.</p>
</div><p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2025/02/whistleblowing-denunce-personali-cassazione/">LA CORTE DI CASSAZIONE SI PRONUNCIA SULL’UTILIZZO DEL WHISTLEBLOWING NELLE DENUNCE DI CARATTERE PERSONALE</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
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		<title>GDPR, NO AI RISARCIMENTI “FACILI”: I PALETTI DELLA CORTE UE</title>
		<link>https://www.dejalex.com/2024/11/gdpr-no-ai-risarcimenti-facili-i-paletti-della-corte-ue/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[marketude]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 Nov 2024 09:51:27 +0000</pubDate>
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<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2024/11/gdpr-no-ai-risarcimenti-facili-i-paletti-della-corte-ue/">GDPR, NO AI RISARCIMENTI “FACILI”: I PALETTI DELLA CORTE UE</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><h4>La Corte di Giustizia europea restringe i criteri per ottenere indennizzi. Servono prove concrete di pregiudizio, stop a richieste automatiche e risarcimenti per lievi disagi</h4>
<p>L’introduzione del Regolamento <span style="text-decoration: underline;"><a href="https://www.agendadigitale.eu/sicurezza/gdpr-tutto-cio-che-ce-da-sapere-per-essere-preparati/" data-wpel-link="internal">Generale sulla Protezione dei Dati (GDPR)</a></span> ha rappresentato una pietra miliare per la protezione dei dati personali nell’Unione Europea e nel mondo. Oltre a fornire regole rigorose per il trattamento dei dati, il GDPR riconosce infatti ai cittadini europei <strong>il diritto di ottenere un risarcimento in caso di violazione delle norme</strong>, come sancito dall’articolo 82 del Regolamento. In questo contesto, la Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione Europea (CGUE) continua a giocare un ruolo cruciale nel definire i contorni di tale previsione normativa.</p>
<p>Articolo di <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><a href="https://www.dejalex.com/associate/jacopo-piemonte/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Jacopo Piemonte</a></span></strong> e Federico Aluigi pubblicato su <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><a href="https://www.agendadigitale.eu/sicurezza/privacy/gdpr-no-ai-risarcimenti-facili-i-paletti-della-corte-ue/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Agenda Digitale</a></span></strong>.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter wp-image-30460" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GDPR-no-ai-risarcimenti-facili-i-paletti-della-Corte-Ue.jpg" alt="" width="585" height="593" srcset="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GDPR-no-ai-risarcimenti-facili-i-paletti-della-Corte-Ue.jpg 1454w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GDPR-no-ai-risarcimenti-facili-i-paletti-della-Corte-Ue-296x300.jpg 296w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GDPR-no-ai-risarcimenti-facili-i-paletti-della-Corte-Ue-1010x1024.jpg 1010w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GDPR-no-ai-risarcimenti-facili-i-paletti-della-Corte-Ue-768x779.jpg 768w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GDPR-no-ai-risarcimenti-facili-i-paletti-della-Corte-Ue-100x101.jpg 100w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GDPR-no-ai-risarcimenti-facili-i-paletti-della-Corte-Ue-862x874.jpg 862w, https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GDPR-no-ai-risarcimenti-facili-i-paletti-della-Corte-Ue-1200x1217.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 585px) 100vw, 585px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://www.agendadigitale.eu/sicurezza/privacy/gdpr-no-ai-risarcimenti-facili-i-paletti-della-corte-ue/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><i  class="x-icon x-icon-link" data-x-icon-s="&#xf0c1;" aria-hidden="true"></i> Read More</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2024/11/gdpr-no-ai-risarcimenti-facili-i-paletti-della-corte-ue/">GDPR, NO AI RISARCIMENTI “FACILI”: I PALETTI DELLA CORTE UE</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
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		<title>LA VIDEOSORVEGLIANZA SUL LUOGO DI LAVORO: UN NUOVO PROVVEDIMENTO DEL GARANTE CONFERMA I PRECEDENTI APPRODI INTERPRETATIVI</title>
		<link>https://www.dejalex.com/2024/07/provvedimento-garante-videosorveglianza-luogo-lavoro/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[marketude]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Jul 2024 14:07:31 +0000</pubDate>
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<p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2024/07/provvedimento-garante-videosorveglianza-luogo-lavoro/">LA VIDEOSORVEGLIANZA SUL LUOGO DI LAVORO: UN NUOVO PROVVEDIMENTO DEL GARANTE CONFERMA I PRECEDENTI APPRODI INTERPRETATIVI</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="1" height="1" src="https://www.dejalex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/000000-0.0.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><h5 style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>Il quadro normativo generale</strong></h5>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Il tema della videosorveglianza sul luogo di lavoro rappresenta un importante punto di intersezione tra il diritto del lavoro e la protezione dei dati personali. Come noto, in tale aerea è infatti richiesto il rispetto dei requisiti posti dall’articolo 4, comma 1, della legge 20 maggio 1970 n. 300 (Statuto dei Lavoratori)<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup>[1]</sup></a>, anche per effetto dell’esplicito richiamo all’articolo 114 del Decreto legislativo 30 giugno 2003 n. 196 (Codice della Privacy).</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Questa disposizione statuisce che l’utilizzo di impianti audiovisivi e di altri strumenti da cui derivi la possibilità di controllo a distanza dei lavoratori sia giustificato alternativamente da esigenze organizzative e produttive, di sicurezza del lavoro o di tutela del patrimonio aziendale. Inoltre, premessa la presenza di almeno una di queste condizioni, occorre ulteriormente l’accordo con le Organizzazioni Sindacali o l’autorizzazione della sede territoriale dell’Ispettorato Nazionale del Lavoro.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Ancora, ai sensi del terzo comma, affinché le informazioni acquisite con tali strumenti siano utilizzabili “a tutti i fini connessi al rapporto di lavoro”, tra cui quelli disciplinari e giudiziali, è necessario fornire adeguata informazione nei confronti del lavoratore circa le modalità d’uso degli strumenti e di effettuazione dei controlli, nonché il rispetto del disposto del Codice della Privacy.</p>
<h5 style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>Il provvedimento del Garante</strong></h5>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Coerentemente con tali premesse, è di particolare rilievo un provvedimento del Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali (Garante) dell’11 aprile 2024<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup>[2]</sup></a>. Il relativo procedimento veniva instaurato a seguito di una segnalazione da parte di una dipendente di un Comune italiano che lamentava “l’installazione di un sistema di videosorveglianza nella sede del Comune, in prossimità dei sistemi di rilevazione delle presenze e in assenza dell’accordo con le organizzazioni sindacali, nonché l’impiego di tale sistema per l’effettuazione di specifiche contestazioni disciplinari alla dipendente (…)”<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup>[3]</sup></a>. Attraverso l’utilizzo delle immagini registrate, l’amministrazione aveva infatti contestato alla dipendente alcune violazioni dei propri doveri d’ufficio, tra cui il mancato rispetto dell’orario di servizio. Si obiettava nei confronti del Comune altresì di non avere fornito un’idonea informativa sul trattamento dei dati acquisiti tramite tale apparecchiatura, tanto relativamente ai lavoratori quanto agli utenti e visitatori della sede, e di aver proceduto in assenza dell’indicazione di tutti gli elementi richiesti dal Regolamento (UE) 2016/679 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio del 27 aprile 2016 (<em>General Data Protection Regulation</em>, GDPR, da ora “Regolamento”).</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Il Garante ha effettivamente riscontrato profili di illegittimità con riferimento a tali condotte, e ha comminato al Comune una sanzione amministrativa pari a 3.000 euro ai sensi dell’articolo 83 del GDPR<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup>[4]</sup></a>.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Illustreremo di seguito in dettaglio il provvedimento.</p>
<h5 style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>La liceità del trattamento dei dati ottenuti senza previa autorizzazione </strong></h5>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Il Comune in questione aveva asseritamente installato i c.d. “occhi elettronici” per la tutela del patrimonio comunale e dell’incolumità dei propri dipendenti, in seguito a un’aggressione ai danni di un assistente sociale e di un assessore. L’autorizzazione da parte della sede territoriale dell’Ispettorato del Lavoro era stata però concessa solo in una data successiva all’entrata in funzione del dispositivo. Anteriormente a tal data, a seguito di segnalazioni circa alcune condotte della dipendente-reclamante non conformi al contratto di lavoro (nella specie, appunto, gli orari di ingresso e uscita), il Sindaco aveva esaminato le registrazioni del sistema di sicurezza per verificarne la veridicità, e proprio sulla base di detta verifica erano state avviate le contestazioni disciplinari.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Da queste circostanze, osserva il Garante, ne sarebbe derivato, da un lato, l’illiceità del trattamento dei dati così ottenuti per tutto il periodo precedente all’autorizzazione <em>ex</em> art. 4 nei confronti della generalità dei lavoratori; dall’altro, per ciò che qui interessa, l’impossibilità di utilizzare gli stessi a fini disciplinari.</p>
<h5 style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>Il profilo della trasparenza</strong></h5>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Il secondo aspetto critico messo in luce dal Garante concerne la trasparenza del trattamento posto in essere. Occorre infatti ricordare che l’utilizzo per fini disciplinari di informazioni raccolte nel rispetto dell’art. 4, commi 1 o 2, dello Statuto dei Lavoratori, non sarebbe di per sé precluso. È però necessaria, oltre alla suddetta autorizzazione, l’ulteriore osservanza del quadro normativo in materia di protezione dei dati, per cui in particolare è necessario “fornire agli interessati ogni necessaria informazione per assicurare ai dipendenti piena consapevolezza degli ulteriori trattamenti che il datore di lavoro si riserva di effettuare”<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup>[5]</sup></a>. Da qui, veniva contestata al Comune l’inadeguatezza dell’informativa di secondo livello sul trattamento dei dati personali fornita agli interessati (tanto lavoratori quanto utenti o visitatori), la quale avrebbe dovuto “contenere tutti gli elementi obbligatori a norma dell’art. 13 del Regolamento”<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup>[6]</sup></a>. Sul punto, il Comune si difendeva sostenendo di aver assolto a detti obblighi con la pubblicazione del regolamento comunale sulla videosorveglianza, approvato nell’anno 2005. Proprio su queste premesse, veniva però evidenziato come tale documento non contenesse tutti gli elementi richiesti dall’art. 13 del Regolamento, essendo stato oltretutto approvato ben prima dell’implementazione dello stesso. Peraltro, ha precisato il Garante, atti e documenti che, come nel caso di specie, sono redatti dal datore di lavoro per assolvere ad obblighi diversi rispetto a quelli derivanti dalla disciplina in materia di protezione dei dati, non possono comunque sostituire l’informativa che il titolare deve rendere, prima di iniziare il trattamento, agli interessati in merito alle caratteristiche essenziali dello stesso.</p>
<h5 style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>L’annosa questione dei ‘’controlli difensivi’’</strong></h5>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">È significativo, inoltre, l’approfondimento di un tema che emerge da una difesa del Comune che ha richiamato i c.d. ‘’controlli difensivi’’. Tale categoria è di indubbio interesse giurisprudenziale e dottrinale, e, come evidenziato dal Garante stesso, di difficile inquadramento dogmatico.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">La figura dei controlli difensivi è stata elaborata dalla giurisprudenza precedentemente alla modifica dell’art. 4 dello Statuto dei Lavoratori derivata dall’art. 23 del d.lgs. n. 151 del 2015 e dall’art. 5 d.lgs. n. 185 del 2016<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup>[7]</sup></a>. La <em>ratio</em> era quella di consentire al datore di lavoro di rispondere a eventuali comportamenti illeciti del personale con controlli, senza azioni preliminari, laddove vi fosse necessità di tutelare il patrimonio e l’immagine aziendale, beni considerati estranei al rapporto di lavoro e per questo motivo non rientranti nel campo di applicazione dell’art. 4 dello Statuto dei Lavoratori<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup>[8]</sup></a>.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">La questione sull’eventuale “sopravvivenza” dei controlli difensivi successivamente alle modifiche dell’art. 4 non si presta ad interpretazione univoca<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup>[9]</sup></a>. A tal riguardo, la recente giurisprudenza della Corte di Cassazione ha operato una distinzione tra ‘’controlli difensivi’’ in senso lato e ‘’controlli difensivi’’ in senso stretto, ritenendo che questi ultimi non rientrino nel perimetro applicativo dell’art. 4 (e quindi “sfuggano” alla relativa autorizzazione ivi richiesta), in quanto ‘’diretti ad accertare specificamente condotte illecite ascrivibili &#8211; in base a concreti indizi &#8211; a singoli dipendenti, anche se questo si verifica durante la prestazione di lavoro’’<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup>[10]</sup></a>, sebbene ‘’in nessun caso può essere giustificato un sostanziale annullamento di ogni forma di garanzia della dignità e riservatezza del lavoratore”<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup>[11]</sup></a>. Il giudice, nel bilanciamento degli interessi del lavoratore e del datore di lavoro, deve dunque compiere un apprezzamento di tutte le circostanze del caso concreto, tenendo conto del complesso dei principi espressi nel Codice della privacy e nel Regolamento<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup>[12]</sup></a>.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Il Comune tentava di fare leva sulla giurisprudenza citata affermando che ‘’la condotta de quo era (…) diretta ad accertare specifiche condotte illecite lesive dell’immagine dell’Ente…’’ e che ‘’quindi, i dati sono stati trattati in conseguenza di quei ‘’controlli difensivi in senso stretto’’ (…) estranei dal campo di applicazione dell’art 4 dello Statuto dei lavoratori…’’<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13"><sup>[13]</sup></a>. Tale difesa non ha però trovato “terreno fertile”. A riguardo, è opportuno osservare che il monitoraggio degli ingressi e delle uscite dal luogo di lavoro non è riconducibile a un controllo su una condotta illecita, ma al contrario costituisce un atto di sorveglianza sull’adempimento dell’obbligazione contrattuale<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14"><sup>[14]</sup></a>, non potendo quindi rappresentare un controllo difensivo. Inoltre, un ulteriore caposaldo che emerge dalla giurisprudenza è costituito dalla necessità che il controllo avvenga <em>ex post</em><a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15"><sup>[15]</sup></a>. In altre parole, la raccolta delle informazioni deve essere effettuata solamente a seguito del fondato sospetto del datore di lavoro circa la commissione di illeciti da parte del dipendente<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16"><sup>[16]</sup></a>. Appare evidente come questa circostanza non ricorresse nel caso di specie e come il Garante abbia dunque correttamente respinto tale difesa. Per ultimo, nella totale assenza di trasparenza e del rispetto della normativa sulla privacy, un bilanciamento degli interessi del datore di lavoro e della lavoratrice avrebbe comunque portato alla necessità di tutelare prevalentemente la seconda.</p>
<h5 style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>Considerazioni conclusive</strong></h5>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Il provvedimento analizzato in questo contributo dimostra come il tema della videosorveglianza nei luoghi di lavoro continui a destare un peculiare interesse, tanto per la società civile nel suo complesso quanto per il contesto lavorativo pubblico e privato: regolamentare con precisione l’installazione di videocamere, risulta ad oggi di imprescindibile importanza per poi garantire la possibilità di utilizzare i dati raccolti attraverso tali sistemi. Emerge dunque l&#8217;importanza di rispettare rigorosamente le normative vigenti, garantendo trasparenza e adeguata informazione ai lavoratori.</p>
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<p id="_ftn1">[1] Secondo l’articolo 4 dello Statuto dei Lavoratori ‘’… <em>Gli impianti audiovisivi e gli altri strumenti dai quali derivi anche la possibilità di controllo a distanza dell&#8217;attività dei lavoratori possono essere impiegati esclusivamente per esigenze organizzative e produttive, per la sicurezza del lavoro e per la tutela del patrimonio aziendale e possono essere installati previo accordo collettivo stipulato dalla rappresentanza sindacale unitaria o dalle rappresentanze sindacali aziendali. In alternativa, nel caso di imprese con unità produttive ubicate in diverse province della stessa regione ovvero in più regioni, tale accordo può essere stipulato dalle associazioni sindacali comparativamente più rappresentative sul piano nazionale. In mancanza di accordo, gli impianti e gli strumenti di cui al primo periodo possono essere installati previa autorizzazione delle sede territoriale dell&#8217;Ispettorato nazionale del lavoro o, in alternativa, nel caso di imprese con unità produttive dislocate negli ambiti di competenza di più sedi territoriali, della sede centrale dell&#8217;Ispettorato nazionale del lavoro. I provvedimenti di cui al terzo periodo sono definitivi.</em></p>
<p><em>La disposizione di cui al comma 1 non si applica agli strumenti utilizzati dal lavoratore per rendere la prestazione lavorativa e agli strumenti di registrazione degli accessi e delle presenze.</em></p>
<p><em>Le informazioni raccolte ai sensi dei commi 1 e 2 sono utilizzabili a tutti i fini connessi al rapporto di lavoro a condizione che sia data al lavoratore adeguata informazione delle modalità d&#8217;uso degli strumenti e di effettuazione dei controlli e nel rispetto di quanto disposto dal decreto legislativo 30 giugno 2003, n. 196 …</em>’’.</p>
<p id="_ftn2">[2] Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali, Provvedimento dell’11 aprile 2024, doc. web n. 10013356.</p>
<p id="_ftn3">[3] Si veda il par. 1 del provvedimento.</p>
<p id="_ftn4">[4] Specificamente, la responsabilità dell’ente è stata fatta derivare dalla violazione dell’articolo 114 del Codice della privacy che a sua volta richiama l’articolo 4 dello Statuto dei lavoratori. La cornice edittale in tale caso è stabilita dall’articolo 83 del GDPR.</p>
<p id="_ftn5">[5] Si veda il par. 3.3 del provvedimento.</p>
<p id="_ftn6">[6] Si vedano “Linee guida 3/2019 sul trattamento dei dati personali attraverso dispositivi video”, nonché il “Provvedimento in materia di videosorveglianza” del Garante dell’8 aprile 2010; si consultino, da ultimo, le recenti FAQ del Garante in materia di videosorveglianza.</p>
<p id="_ftn7">[7] A seguito delle modifiche così introdotte, al comma 2 dell’art. 4 dello Statuto dei Lavoratori si prevede la non applicazione delle causali di installazione agli strumenti utilizzati dal lavoratore per rendere la prestazione lavorativa e agli strumenti di registrazione degli accessi e delle presenze.</p>
<p id="_ftn8">[8] Si veda l’Ordinanza della Corte di Cassazione, Sezione Lavoro, del 28 maggio 2018 n 13266: <em>‘’… appare allora evidente come esorbiti dal campo di applicazione della norma il caso in cui il datore abbia posto in essere verifiche dirette ad accertare comportamenti del prestatore illeciti e lesivi del patrimonio e dell&#8217;immagine aziendale: e tanto più se si tratti di controlli posti in essere ex post, ovvero dopo l&#8217;attuazione del comportamento addebitato al dipendente, quando siano emersi elementi di fatto tali da raccomandare l&#8217;avvio di un&#8217;indagine retrospettiva (Cass. 23 febbraio 2012, n. 2722), così da prescindere dalla pura e semplice sorveglianza sull&#8217;esecuzione della prestazione lavorativa degli addetti, invece diretta ad accertare la perpetrazione di eventuali comportamenti illeciti (poi effettivamente riscontrati) dagli stessi posti in essere (Cass. 27 maggio 2015, n. 10955) …’’.</em></p>
<p id="_ftn9">[9] Si veda Cassazione Civile, Sez. Lav., 22 settembre 2021, n. 25732, punto 27. Una conferma della sopravvivenza dei ‘’controlli difensivi’’ può essere rinvenuta nella giurisprudenza della Corte Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo, caso <em>López Ribalda e altri c. Spagna</em>, 17 ottobre 2019, nel quale è stata dichiarata la legittimità di un controllo occulto da parte di un datore di lavoro, compiuto in maniera proporzionata rispetto al fondato sospetto del compimento di gravi illeciti da parte di alcuni dipendenti.</p>
<p id="_ftn10">[10] Si veda Cassazione Civile, Sez. Lav., n. 18168 del 26 giugno 2023, punto 2.1, la quale a sua volta cita Cassazione Civile, Sez. Lav., n. 25732 del 22 settembre 2021, punti 31 e 32.</p>
<p id="_ftn11">[11] <em>Ibid.</em>, punto 2.6, la quale a sua volta cita Cassazione Civile, Sez. Lav., n. 25732 del 22 settembre 2021, punto 37.</p>
<p id="_ftn12">[12] <em>Ibid.,</em> punto 2.7. In particolare la Corte ha statuito che: <em>‘’Il rilievo che, per i controlli difensivi in senso stretto, non opera la disciplina speciale dettata dall&#8217;art. 4 dello Statuto, come novellato, non significa che, laddove sia comunque riscontrabile un trattamento di dati personali del lavoratore, non occorra rispettare la disciplina generale prevista per la protezione di qualsiasi cittadino dal Codice della privacy, vigente all&#8217;epoca dei fatti della presente causa, e, a partire dal 25 maggio 2018, dal Regolamento UE 2016/679 e dallo stesso Codice, come modificato dal D.Lgs. n. 101 del 2018 entrato in vigore il 19 settembre 2018. Se anche nel caso di controlli a distanza attuati nell&#8217;osservanza dei commi 1 e 2 dell&#8217;art. 4 St. lav., il comma 3 dello stesso articolo pretende il &#8220;rispetto di quanto disposto dal D.Lgs. 20 giugno 2003, n. 196&#8221;, costituirebbe una ingiustificata aporia del sistema &#8211; peraltro priva di base legale &#8211; il sottrarre alla disciplina generale della protezione dei dati personali il rapporto del lavoratore con il suo datore. Pertanto, il complesso dei principi espressi nel Codice della privacy e nel Regolamento Europeo 2016/679 (GDPR) deve orientare il giudice nella delicata opera di bilanciamento e di delimitazione del confine tra l&#8217;interesse del lavoratore e l&#8217;interesse del datore di lavoro, con un contemperamento che non può prescindere dall&#8217;apprezzamento di tutte le circostanze del caso concreto. Ancor prima lo stesso datore di lavoro, in sede di iniziativa finalizzata ad attuare un controllo per fini difensivi, è tenuto a compiere una valutazione relativa all&#8217;impatto concreto nei confronti della sfera personale dei lavoratori, alla stregua dei principi che regolano, per chiunque, le modalità di trattamento dei dati personali.’’</em></p>
<p id="_ftn13">[13] Si veda il par. 2 del provvedimento.</p>
<p id="_ftn14">[14] Conformemente a tale interpretazione: Cassazione Civile, Sez. Lav., n. 25645 del 1° settembre 2023, che ha riformato le decisioni di merito che ritenevano estraneo all’attività lavorativa il controllo di ingressi e uscite dal luogo di lavoro.</p>
<p id="_ftn15">[15] A sostegno della diversa tesi secondo cui il controllo <em>ex post</em> sia solo eventuale e che abbia meramente funzione confermativa dell’effettività del controllo difensivo: Cassazione Penale, Sez. 3, n. 3255 del 27 gennaio 2021, punto 4.4, che a sua volta richiama Cassazione Civile, Sez. Lav., n. 13266 del 28 maggio 2018. La natura eventuale di questo presupposto era indiscussa nell’interpretazione del previgente articolo 4 secondo Cassazione Civile, Sez. Lav., n. 25732 del 22 settembre 2021, punti 20-21.</p>
<p id="_ftn16">[16] Cassazione Civile, Sez. Lav., n. 25732 del 22 settembre 2021, punti da 40 a 44.</p>
</div><p>The post <a href="https://www.dejalex.com/2024/07/provvedimento-garante-videosorveglianza-luogo-lavoro/">LA VIDEOSORVEGLIANZA SUL LUOGO DI LAVORO: UN NUOVO PROVVEDIMENTO DEL GARANTE CONFERMA I PRECEDENTI APPRODI INTERPRETATIVI</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dejalex.com">Studio Legale De Berti Jacchia Franchini Forlani</a>.</p>
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