On 26 February 2026, the Commission presented a new Agenda[1] putting forward a comprehensive set of cross-sectoral initiatives to prevent and counter terrorism by stepping up the EU preparedness and response. Announced in the ProtectEU action[2], the Agenda finds its rationale in the fact that the increasing links between terrorism and other crime areas, as well as the blurred lines between online and physical operations, pose a particular challenge to defining and identifying terrorist offences. Despite the EU has already taken steps to tackle terrorism and violent extremism, the overall threat level remains high, requiring a single action at EU level. The Agenda combines ongoing and new initiatives to keep up with the fast-evolving landscape, anticipate threats, prevent radicalisation, protect people both online and offline and strengthen the global fight against terrorism in line with international law. The Agenda is built around six pillars.

First, the Agenda highlights that the dynamic nature of emerging threats requires, on the one hand, strengthened law enforcement anticipation capabilities and, on the other hand, the ability to identify the risks and opportunities stemming from new technologies. The Agenda, therefore, proposes measures to improve situational awareness and the early detection of emerging threats such as, amongst others, increasing the resources and capacities of intelligence analysis of the EU Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC)[3], reinforcing Europol’s analytical support capacities, including open-source intelligence (OSINT) ones, and supporting the testing and deployment of EU-funded solutions to equip law enforcement with state-of-the-art tools.

Second, preventing radicalisation requires a holistic approach and long-term strategies. In particular, minors’ involvement in radicalisation and terrorism affects not only the minors concerned, but likewise communities and society. To prevent minors being radicalised across Europe, the Commission will build on the activities of the Knowledge Hub on Prevention of Radicalisation[4] and focus on early detection, resilience through education and social integration to provide strategic guidance. The Hub will also develop tools to assess and manage risks in the pre-release phase of prisoners who have served their sentence but may have been radicalised. Finally, the Commission will launch a Community Engagement and Empowerment Programme (CEEP) allocating EUR 5 million to equip civil society and practitioners with digital skills for effective online interventions and to amplify the voices of youth engaged in prevention.

Third, despite the EU has built one of the most advanced regulatory frameworks in the world to counter terrorist activity online, extremist networks tend to adapt quickly, exploit emerging technologies and shift from open platforms to closed chats and encrypted services. To ensure people online are adequately protected, the Commission will consider revising the Terrorist Content Online Regulation[5] to keep it fit for purpose and enforcing the Digital Services Act (DSA)[6]. Furthermore, the Commission will upgrade the EU Crisis Protocol[7] into an EU Online Crisis Response Framework to be relied on by Member States where an incident leads to heightened online activity related to an attack and to anchor it in the DSA environment, thereby ensuring a coordinated response to crises.

The Commission also intends to make sure people are protected in the physical environment. Since timely access to data is cardinal to identifying foreign terrorist fighters and terrorist suspects at borders, the Commission, together with Europol, will strengthen cooperation with trusted third countries to obtain biographic and biometric data on individuals that might pose a terrorist threat, for them to be inserted into the Schengen Information System (SIS) in full compliance with applicable EU and national legal frameworks. Furthermore, the Commission will explore options to expand the framework on advanced travel information to include private flights, maritime and land transport, which is currently limited to commercial air transport thereby resulting in legal and operational loopholes that terrorists may exploit to move across the EU.

Fourth, to ensure a swift and coordinated response to terrorist threats and attacks, the law enforcement and judicial agencies need to be further strengthened across Europe, and further efforts are called for to close the remaining gaps and foreclose counter terrorist financing. In this regard, the Commission will launch a study to assess and identify the appropriate measures to establish a future EU-wide system to enable the retrieval of financial data for the purpose of tracking terrorist financing and organised crime as well as revise Europol and Eurojust’s mandates. Moreover, the Commission will support closer cooperation and information sharing between financial intelligence units, law enforcement, financial institutions and online service providers. Finally, since the external and internal dimensions of terrorism and violent extremism are intrinsically linked, the Commission will strengthen international cooperation with trusted partner countries following a human-rights based approach.  

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On 26 February 2026, the Commission presented a Proposal[1] for a Directive to combat firearms trafficking and other firearms-related offences in the EU.

Part of ProtectEU[2], the Proposal finds its rationale in the fact that criminal demand and access to firearms, which pose a serious threat to EU citizens’ security as they enable a wide range of serious and organised crimes, are increasing and leading to more violent accidents in some Member States. Despite the EU has engaged at international level in actions to control firearms, there are still significant differences among Member States in how firearm-related crimes are defined and punished, leading to a fragmented legal framework across the Union. The Proposal aims to protect European citizens from the threat of illicit firearms by reducing their number and the related criminal activities, harmonising firearm offences and penalties across Member States and improving data quality and availability to better understand and address the threat.

The Proposal introduces harmonised definitions for offenses such as, amongst the others, illicit manufacturing, trafficking and possession of firearms or falsification and modification of markings on firearms[3]. Member States should take the necessary measures to ensure that such criminal offences are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, setting an upper limit depending on the type of offence[4]. Member States should ensure that also legal persons can be held liable for the criminal offences committed for their benefit by a person who has a leading position therein and who acts individually or as part of one of their organs on the basis of a power of representation, an authority to take decisions on their behalf or an authority to exercise control[5].

Member States will need to adopt, within their national legal systems, the measures necessary to prevent the illicit manufacturing and trafficking in firearms, their essential components and ammunition seized and confiscated by their authorities from falling into the hands of unauthorised persons[6]. Moreover, they should also take the necessary measures to provide for a sufficient limitation period after the commission of the criminal offences, to be related to their gravity, enabling for the investigation, prosecution, trial and adjudication of those offences to be tackled effectively[7].

Each Member State should establish its jurisdiction over the criminal offences of which the Proposal is comprised, where the offence was committed i) in whole or in part within its territory, ii) on board a ship or an aircraft registered in that Member State or flying its flag, or iii) by one of its nationals. A Member State should inform the Commission where it decides to extend its jurisdiction to one or more criminal offences committed outside its territory, where i) the offender is a habitual resident therein, ii) the offence is committed for the benefit of a legal person established in its territory or in respect of any business done in whole or in part on its territory, or iii) the offence is committed against one or more of its nationals or habitual residents. Where a criminal offence falls within the jurisdiction of more than one Member State, they should cooperate to determine which one is to conduct the criminal proceedings[8].

Each Member State will designate a single National Firearms Focal Point for coordination and cooperation among all its competent authorities involved in the prevention of, and the fight against, firearms-related criminal offences, provided with an appropriate structure as well as sufficient staff and resources to ensure their continuous operation and effective functioning[9].

Finally, the Proposal introduces new measures to improve the collection and standardisation of available data on firearms. More particularly, Member States should ensure that firearms seized by law enforcement or other competent agencies are registered using the minimum dataset set out in the Annex, which was developed in cooperation with practitioners and includes basic information such as the model and type of firearm[10]. Moreover, Member States should gather existing statistical data in relation to the several firearms-related offences through a digital system and share it with the Commission every five years[11].

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1. Introduction

2. From an overprotected bloodline to a compensation-based system

3. Article 563 Civil Code. Obligation of the donee and liability of gratuitous transferees

4. The new Articles 561 and 2652 Civil Code. Encumbrances, mortgages and the end of symmetry between donee and legatee

1. The first sentence of Article 561(1) Civil Code provided that, where an action for reduction of a donation was brought, the immovable property had to be restored to the estate free from any encumbrances or mortgages created by the legatee or the donee. This “cleansing” effect applied only if the claim for reduction was registered within ten years from the opening of the succession pursuant to Article 2652(1)(8). Once that period had elapsed, any rights acquired for value by third parties under an instrument registered before the claim for reduction were preserved, even in the face of a judgment upholding the action.
2. The second sentence of Article 561(1) Civil Code provided that encumbrances and mortgages remain effective only if the action for reduction is brought more than twenty years after registration of the donation, subject, however, to the donee’s obligation to compensate the forced heirs in money for the reduced value of the assets where the claim for reduction is brought within ten years from the opening of the succession.

• For the legatee, nothing changes in principle. Any property restored as a result of an action for reduction must be returned free of encumbrances and mortgages created by the legatee, subject to a re-balancingrule, introducing the three-year term from the opening of the succession, beyond which third-party acquirers from the heir or legatee who have registered before the claim are in any case protected.
• For the donee, the principle is reversed. Encumbrances and mortgages created by the donee on assets subject to restitution remain effective. The “cleansing” effect of the action for restitution is shifted onto the donee’s estate, which must compensate forced heirs in money for the reduced value of the encumbered asset, to the extent needed to reintegrate their share.

5. Article 562 Civil Code and the estate reduction

6. Transitional rules. A six-month window of high-stakes litigation

• Successions opened after entry into force. The new rules apply in full, so that no further “at-risk” situations for third-party purchasers should arise in the future.
• Successions already opened at the date of entry into force. These remain governed by the old regime, but only if:

• a claim for reduction has already been served and registered; or
• such claim is served and registered within six months from entry into force; or
• within the same term an out-of-court notice of opposition to the donation is served and registered, following the pattern already known under former Article 563, fourth paragraph, Civil Code.

1. For several years, two “stocks” of donated properties will coexist: those still exposed to possible actions for restitution (because protected by opposition or a registered claim) and those fully “clean”. Due diligence will need to check not only the date of the succession, but also the presence of any registrations or oppositions within the relevant six-month period.
2. Oppositions already registered before the reform remain fully effective, as paragraph 2 expressly confirms by referring to former Article 563; this means that potential litigation remain in place and will continue to follow the old rules for many years.

7. Insurance features

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In 2025, the fight against counterfeiting in Italy continued to make progress, thanks to the “Made in Italy” law (Law No. 206/2023) and the strengthened commitment of independent authorities such as the Antitrust Authority. Border control measures are becoming increasingly effective and are complemented by criminal proceedings and tools such as the swift destruction of seized counterfeit goods.

In yesterday’s edition of ItaliaOggi, a feature by Luca Settembrini included an interview with our own Roberto A. Jacchia, who discussed the tangible effects of the “Made in Italy” law on the protection of industrial property rights and the fight against counterfeiting.
How effective are anti-counterfeiting measures in Italy today?

“In general, counterfeiting phenomena — despite the various initiatives undertaken by IP rights holders and institutions — still persist. Illegal operators are always one step ahead of legal ones, who try to catch up by pushing for changes and updates in regulations, policies, and judicial approaches. We are perhaps seeing a decline in so-called crude fakes, but there is an exponential increase in counterfeiting, infringements, and unfair commercial practices online”, explains Jacchia.

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On 9 July 2025, the Commission launched two initiatives which, following its Preparedness Union Strategy[1], aim at ensuring continuity of essential goods and lifesaving medical supplies for European citizens and companies at all times, and in particular during crises.

The EU Stockpiling Strategy[2] finds its rationale in the fact that the coronavirus pandemic exposed the vulnerabilities in the EU’s supply chains related to medical products, energy, agri-food and critical raw materials, which was further worsened by the Ukrainian crisis, underscoring the strategic importance of reliable access to affordable energy, critical technologies and infrastructures. The EU, indeed, is presently facing an increasingly complex and deteriorating risk landscape marked by rising geopolitical tensions, climate change, environmental degradation and hybrid and cyber threats. The Stockpiling Strategy introduces a comprehensive approach addressing the entire stockpiling cycle and applying to essential goods, that is, any physical object necessary to maintain vital societal functions, thereby dealing with the EU framework’s shortcomings by identifying seven key areas for action.

In the first place, the Commission will establish an EU stockpiling network with Member States, which, on the one hand, will work as a forum for discussion on best practices regarding, amongst other things, foresight, anticipation, strategic planning and cost-efficiency assessments and, on the other hand, deploy an advisory role, formulating recommendations on issues such as volume requirements, oversight systems and coordination of minimum requirements.

Second, given that stockpiling is expensive and can create market imbalances, Member States should try ensuring the availability of essential goods in their planning processes and assess the relevant stockpiling methodology. The Commission, therefore, will map sectoral supply chain monitoring mechanisms and incorporate security of supply risks and supply chain vulnerability assessments into the envisaged comprehensive EU risk and threat assessment, to avoid or overcome supply shortages or supply chain disruptions.

Third, the Strategy highlights the need for the EU to maintain and scale up its strategic reserves, building on the current rescEU model[3] and expanding it to cover larger capacities. Furthermore, the Commission will continue to encourage efficient stockpiling management practices such as, amongst others, on advanced technology or systems in place or skilled professionals to design and manage stockpiles.

Fourth, since ensuring the availability of essential goods in times of crisis across sectors depends on robust and interoperable transport, logistics and stockpiling infrastructures, the EU will enhance cooperation and coordination to create adaptable policies and regulatory frameworks by simplifying procedures for moving and allocating resources across borders and providing targeted flexibility in transport regulations.

Fifth, together with the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission will, on the one hand, facilitate discussions within the EU stockpiling network to exchange best practices on civil-military cooperation and, on the other hand, expand existing staff cooperation with NATO to address material preparedness and stockpiling. In many crisis scenarios, civil-military cooperation is indispensable: countering and managing the consequences of all forms of attacks depends significantly on civilian capabilities and resources, while the military relies on the functioning of wider societal systems to develop and maintain its material readiness, logistical capability and resilience.

Similarly, public-private cooperation could help reaching out to relevant businesses to build a preparedness fit to address or anticipate supply chain bottlenecks or risks and support stockpiling and emergency production. Furthermore, such cooperation could facilitate a mapping of key European companies involved in material preparedness and promote the exchange of best practices to support Member States’ and the companies’ efforts to become more resilient to internal and external shocks to stockpiling flows.

Finally, the EU should strengthen collaboration with neighbourhood countries on crisis preparedness, given that their security and resilience are closely interlinked and constitute a factor of stability.

The Medical Countermeasures Strategy[4], instead, finds its rationale in the fact that despite being better prepared than during the coronavirus pandemic, the EU is still exposed to a wide range of health threats for which medical countermeasures are often scarce or unavailable. The Strategy, therefore, aims at proactively protecting people from health threats by acknowledging that medical countermeasures are fundamental to make the EU stronger and healthier and better prepared and, as such, need to be accessible  at all times.

In the first place, the Strategy highlights the need for a robust foresight and anticipation system monitoring threats requiring medical countermeasures in an all-hazard approach, to ensure that the EU can rapidly develop and deploy medical countermeasures to respond to health emergencies. The Commission will continue to develop and operationalise its medical countermeasures intelligence system, the Advanced Technology for Health Intelligence and Action IT system (ATHINA), whose first modules became operational in 2025 and which will integrate existing public health and supply chain data collected and analysed through systems operated by, amongst the others, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).

Second, building on the expertise and mandate of the ECDC, and in line with the ambitions set out in the Preparedness Union Strategy, the Commission will further strengthen its capacity to detect and assess threats taking an all-hazard and whole-of-society approach, covering traditional health threats like disease outbreaks, the impacts of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents as well as armed conflicts and mass casualty events in the EU or its neighbourhood.

Third, to maximise the impact of EU funding and better use the potential of the EU budget to accelerate the development of medical countermeasures, the Commission will develop a Medical Countermeasures Accelerator tool by 2025, which will work as an integrated and simplified framework to speed up the development of medical countermeasures and support innovators throughout the whole cycle. Currently, the EU funding tools to advance the research and development of medical countermeasures are fragmented across several programmes, thereby hindering an efficient and coherent progress. Functioning as a one-stop-shop, the Accelerator will ensure instead a fair, transparent and competitive process through catalytic actions and support to innovation enablers, ensuring synergies, financial instruments available in EU programmes and avoiding duplication.

Fourth, the Commission will launch the Rapid Agile Manufacturing Partnership for Union Protection (RAMP UP), a voluntary network of EU-based pharmaceutical manufacturers, innovators and suppliers which will create a rapid-response industrial force to protect citizens in times of crisis by collecting essential information on medical countermeasures, manufacturing capacities during preparedness times and enabling the EU institutions to identify supply chain risks and respond swiftly to emergencies.

Finally, the Commission will continue to work with Member States to ensure rapid and equitable access to medical countermeasures. More particularly, the Commission will take into consideration revising the 2014 Joint Procurement Agreement for medical countermeasures[5] to align it with the new Financial Regulation[6] and make it better fit for nowadays’ needs for procurement. Furthermore, the Commission will facilitate swift response to health emergencies by supporting local detection of threats by easily deployable, ready-to-use laboratories for biological and chemical hazards in emergency situations, allowing affected communities to receive the diagnostic support they need.

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[1] For further information see our previous article, available at the following LINK.

[2] Com. Comm. COM(2025) 528 final of 09.07.2025, EU stockpiling strategy: Boosting the EU’s material preparedness for crises.

[3] For further information see our previous article, available at the following LINK.

[4] Com. Comm. COM(2025) 529 final of 09.07.2025, Preparing the EU for the next health crisis: a Medical Countermeasures Strategy.

[5] Available at the following LINK.

[6] Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, OJ L 2024/2509 of 26.09.2024.

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On 17 June 2025, the Commission proposed a series of measures, laid down in a so-called “Defence readiness Omnibus”[1], aimed, on the one hand, at helping Member States to scale up their defence capabilities and infrastructures to reach the levels of readiness required to prepare for and deter future conflicts and, on the other hand, to speed up defence investments and production to make the EU more responsive to security challenges.

The Defence Omnibus restates the White Paper for European Defence-Readiness 2030’s rationale[2] that massive investments over a sustained period are fundamental to build a truly independent Europe and fill the substantial gap in defence spend that has accumulated over the last decades. Complementing the amendments presented in April 2025 to existing EU funding programmes[3], therefore, the Defence Omnibus introduces ambitious proposals in defence-specific legislation and programmes as well as in non-defence-specific ones, to remove regulatory barriers and facilitate EU defence readiness and industrial capacity.

In the first place, the Proposal aims to simplify the Defence and Sensitive Security Procurement Directive[4] to address the need for Europe to rebuild its defence vision, give more flexibility to common procurements by several Member States and boost innovative solutions necessary to achieve defence readiness by 2030. The availability of procurement contracts and the long-term predictability of demand are fundamental for industry to ramp up its production and reach defence readiness objectives. The Proposal[5] increases the Directive’s thresholds of applicability to EUR 900.000 for supply and service contracts to enable Member States to reduce the administrative burden on the industry for smaller procurement procedures[6]. Furthermore, to increase the number of ways contracting authorities can carry out public procurement, the Proposal allows them to use the open procedure and the dynamic purchasing system provided for in Directive 2014/24/EU[7] and introduces a simplified procedure for the direct procurement of innovative products or services resulting from competitive parallel research and development projects[8]. Finally, to provide Member States with the necessary flexibility in responding to emerging security challenges and to enable them to quickly acquire the defence capabilities they need, the Proposal introduces a temporary derogation to use of the negotiated procedure without prior publication for common procurements, including off-the-shelf procurement[9].

The Proposal also amends Directive 2009/43/EC[10] to allow the swift transfers of defence-related products within the Union, which in turn will help mobilise the full industrial and technological capacities across Member States, achieve innovation and ensure security of supply. More particularly, upon request of a Member State or on its own initiative, the Commission will be empowered to introduce new cases where Member States may provide for exemptions from prior authorisation for transfers of defence-related products to include, amongst others, those necessary for the implementation of projects funded by EU defence industrial programmes, those in the framework of structured cross-border industrial partnerships and those related to an emergency resulting from a crisis[11]. Furthermore, Member States will be required to enable the introduction of General Transfer Licences[12] other than those already listed in Article 5(2), i.e. regarding EU defence industrial projects[13]. Finally, to facilitate cross-border transactions in supply chains and accelerate the production ramp up, the Commission calls on Member States to refrain from intra-EU transfers limitations for components that will be integrated in a final product in another Member State and cannot be re-exported separately.

In the second place, the Proposal[14] introduces additional flexibility in the European Defence Fund (EDF)[15] implementation. More particularly, the Commission proposes to clarify and simplify the award criteria for the evaluation of proposals and introduces the possibility of selecting only the most relevant ones based on the objectives of the calls for proposals, thereby making the evaluation process faster and less burdensome[16]. Furthermore, the Commission simplifies the conditions for pre-commercial procurement, as the current provisions promote the award of multiple contracts within the same procedure, which is not always suitable for all the circumstances. Removing this restriction, on the contrary, will provide for a clearer and more effective pre-commercial procurement framework, enabling the EDF to better support the development of innovative solutions[17]. Finally, the Commission will put in place yet additional measures to speed up the evaluation of proposals and reduce the time to sign grant agreements and issue payments, such as, amongst  others, a higher level of subcontracting or an extended validity of ownership control assessments for beneficiaries.

In the third place, the Proposal[18] highlights the need to expedite the permitting processes for defence industrial investments and defence readiness activities, which are often too lengthy and burdensome. In this regard, Member States will designate a national competent authority acting as a single point of contact, in charge of coordinating and facilitating the permitting processes, guiding economic operators and ensuring that information is publicly accessible and that all documents can be digitally submitted[19]. The permit-granting process for defence readiness projects shall not exceed 60 days, a period Member States can extend i) by a maximum of 30 days where the nature, complexity, location or size of the proposed defence readiness project so requires, and ii) by 60 days, within 30 days of the start of the permit-granting process, where the project raises exceptional risks for the health and safety of workers or of the general population, and where additional time is necessary to establish that measures to address identifiable risks have been put in place[20]. Moreover, all dispute resolution procedures, litigation, appeals and judicial remedies, as well as all administrative proceedings related to defence readiness projects, before any national courts shall be treated as urgent if and to the extent national law concerning the relevant  processes provides for such urgency procedures, and provided that the applicable rights of defence of individuals or local communities are respected[21].

In the fourth place, the Commission notes that the existing possibility for Member States to allow for exemptions in specific cases for certain substances, where necessary in the interests of defence, as provided for by the Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH)[22] does not meet the needs of the defence industry. This may depend on the exemption being limited to specific cases as well as to a restrictive interpretation by the Member States. The Commission, therefore, proposes to amend Article 2(3) so that it should not only be applicable to specific cases for certain substances, but rather on their own, in a mixture or in an article[23].

Finally, the Proposal[24] amends the Invest(EU) Regulation[25] to adapt its eligibility criteria for the defence sector to the specificities of the financial instruments offered under the fund, while maintaining the necessary safeguards, which will enhance and simplify access to financing and allow better supporting for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB)’s growth and development, supporting the mobilisation of EUR 800 billion in investments over a period of 4 years.

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On 23 July 2025, the Italian Communications Authority (Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni, AGCOM) updated[1] its Guidelines for influencers and approved a Code of Conduct which, drafted in cooperation with the stakeholders of the so-called “influencer marketing”[2], establishes criteria for transparency and responsibility.

The rules find their rationale, on the one hand, in the exponential growth of influencer marketing in Italy, which generates employment opportunities and value for both influencers and companies, and, on the other hand, in the increasing weight content creators exercise on consumers’ choices. When influencers present a company’s product or service, indeed, they do not simply describe it, but also express their personal opinions, experiences and recommendations, which followers tend to perceive as a spontaneous advice from a role model. The AGCOM, therefore, deemed it necessary to protect the latter by making influencers expressly responsible for the audiovisual contents they create, produce and share on social media.

The Guidelines and the Code are addressed chiefly to influencers, i.e. those persons who carry out a professional activity individually, as a company or as part of an association, similar or comparable to that of audiovisual media service providers. The new rules, however, will not apply to all influencers, but only to the “significant” ones, i.e. those who have a minimum of 500.000 followers on at least one of the social media or video-sharing platforms used or an average monthly viewership of one million. If they reach either threshold on one platform, influencers will have to follow the Guidelines and Code of Conduct on all social media or video-sharing platforms where they have a profile, no matter how many followers they have or how many views they obtain. These individuals will be included in a special list drawn up, administered and updated every six months by an impartial third party appointed by the AGCOM, and will have to show the wording “influencer listed by AGCOM” on their social media profile. Influencers who are not significant according to the Guidelines may still request to be included in the list by registering with the platform managed by the above-mentioned third party and will then be required to comply with the Code of Conduct.

The Code imposes various obligations on influencers.

In the first place, their contents must comply with the provisions of the Consolidated Law on Audiovisual Media Services (Testo Unico dei servizi media audiovisivi, TUSMA)[3] on objectivity, completeness, fairness and impartiality of information, as well as combating disinformation strategies and infringement of intellectual property rights. Second, influencers must respect human dignity and, therefore, not publish content or expressions that are likely to spread, incite, justify, minimise or otherwise legitimize violence, hatred or discrimination. Influencers must moreover comply, on the one hand, with the TUSMA rules on commercial communications, teleshopping, sponsorship and product placement[4] as well as the prohibition of surreptitious advertising, and, on the other hand, with the provisions of the “Digital Chart Regulation”[5] on the recognizability of commercial communications spread via the internet. Finally, influencers must comply with the rules on minors’ protection by not publishing contents that are seriously harmful to their physical, mental or moral development.

Influencers will be fined up to EUR 250.000 if they violate the Code’s general rules and up to EUR 600.000 if they violate those on minors. In determining the amount, the AGCOM will consider the seriousness of the violation, the influencer’s efforts to eliminate or mitigate its consequences as well as his personality and his economic situation.

By qualifying influencers as communication professionals, AGCOM has officially recognised all the changes that have taken place in recent years in the so-called “Creator Economy”[6]. Although the Code has been welcomed by the majority of stakeholders, however, the Italian Customers Association (Coordinamento delle associazioni per la difesa dell’ambiente e dei diritti degli utenti e dei consumatori, Codacons) pointed out that the new rules might not be able to limit the excessive power influencers enjoy, as they do not address the changes brought about by the artificial intelligence and, above all, only apply to influencers operating from Italy, thus allowing those established abroad to remain exempt. The Code, therefore, should not be seen as a final step on the regulation of influencers, but rather as a work in progress that, in the coming years, might avert the occurrence of situations like the so-called “Ferragni case”[7] and grant consumers a stronger protection while ensuring content creators’ liability.

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ItaliaOggi has conducted a survey on career paths in Italian business law firms, highlighting how seniority remains an important requirement but is no longer central to becoming a partner. Meritocracy and performance are playing an increasingly decisive role, with partners’ average age ranging between 45 and 55 years.

Roberto A. Jacchia was interviewed to explain how our Firm is interpreting and managing this evolution. In particular, he explained that the partnership structure at De Berti Jacchia “is under review to reflect the changes in our firm’s composition and market realities. [...] Our mid-term policy drivers include refocusing the practices and industries in which we offer our services, growing the number of professionals at all levels so we can expand into new areas and make existing ones more efficient, lowering the average age of partners and the retirement/cessation age to increase our attractiveness, and encouraging internal growth up to partnership level in order to retain our talents and benefit from our training investments.”

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With a trade surplus of €33.2 billion in 2021, the fashion sector is the second-largest contributor to Italy’s trade balance, making our country the top exporter in the European Union and the second worldwide.

In this context, the introduction of tariffs by the United States could have significant consequences for Italian fashion companies. But how much will it really affect the industry?

“It’s not certain that the Italian fashion sector as a whole will be heavily impacted by the introduction of U.S. tariffs” says Roberto A. Jacchia, interviewed by Il Bollettino, referring in particular to the high-end clothing segment.
“Those willing to spend that kind of money on a purchase won’t be deterred by a price increase, even of 20% […]. This is a sector where demand structurally presents a low price elasticity.”

Want to understand what tariffs are and how the recent ones imposed by the U.S. could affect a strategic industry for Italy—like fashion, especially the luxury segment?

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On 19 March 2025, the Commission presented several strategic defense initiatives to respond to the crisis in Ukraine but also to address the long-standing need to boost Europe’s security and defense infrastructures as well as to reduce its reliance on external allies. The White Paper for European Defence The White Paper[1] finds its rationale in the deep changes Europe is undergoing because of its pivotal role in the major geopolitical challenges of the past century, which highlighted a severe under-investment and lack of efficient spending in its military capabilities. The Paper aims at offering lines of action to close this critical capability gap and encourages Member States to invest in defense and defense systems and build up the readiness of the European defense industry over the long run. In the first place, the Paper sets out seven priority areas[2] which are critical to build a robust European defense, filling the capability gaps already identified by Member States. Since the scale, cost and complexity of most projects in these areas go beyond Member States’ individual capacity, a coordinated action benefiting from the Union’s support would facilitate cost-effective procurement and prompt the ramp-up of European defense industrial resources. In this regard, the Paper points at collaborative procurement as the most efficient means to acquire large quantities of consumables such as ammunition, missiles and drones, as well as deliver on more complex projects since aggregation of demand curtails costs, shortens lead times and ensures interoperability and interchangeability. In the second place, the Paper outlines a vision to increase direct military assistance and associate Ukraine in its development and procurement of defense capabilities. More particularly, the support to Ukraine should focus on two mutually reinforcing priorities. On the one hand, the EU and its Member States should, amongst others, i) provide large-caliber artillery ammunition with a minimum objective of 2 million rounds per year, ii) train and equip Ukrainian brigades and actively support the regeneration of battalions, iii) directly support Ukraine’s defense industry through direct procurement orders, and iv) grant enhanced access to EU space assets and services. On the other hand, the Ukrainian defense industry should be integrated into the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB)[3], which will help it to scale up, modernize and provide cost-efficient products in the global market. In the third place, the Paper points out that, despite being indispensable for defense readiness, the European defense industry still features structural weaknesses preventing it from producing systems and equipment in the quantities and with the speed needed by Member States. Therefore, a massive ramp-up of European production capacity is a prerequisite for Member States to acquire the critical capabilities they currently lack. Industry access to critical inputs is also a cardinal factor, to avoid relying only on one or a handful of suppliers of key-goods, services or other inputs. Moreover, EU policies and investments should strengthen European economic security by minimizing the potential for the weaponization of dependencies or economic coercion. Finally, Member States should work together to build a true EU-wide Market for Defense equipment, which would help achieve key objectives such as global competitiveness, readiness and greater industrial scale. The ReArm Europe Plan The ReArm Europe Plan is a  package outlining the legal and financial means to support the defense investments of Member States, expected to enable the spending of over €800 billion, structured around three pillars. First, in light of the current extraordinary geo-political situation, the Commission proposes[4] to unlock additional flexibility for higher defense spend through a coordinated activation of the national escape clause, which allows Member States to deviate from their net expenditure path, set by the Council in the context of its medium-term fiscal structural plan, in case of exceptional circumstances outside the control of their national authorities and which have a major impact on their public finances, provided that such deviation does not endanger fiscal sustainability over the medium term[5]. The flexibility range under the national escape clause should be capped at 1.5% of the gross domestic product (GDP) compared to the net expenditure path set by the Council, a threshold designed to ensure that fiscal sustainability is preserved while allowing all Member States to benefit from greater flexibility. The new mechanism would be available for four years starting from 2025, after which Member States would need to be ready to sustain a structurally higher spending level through a gradual re-prioritization within their national budgets, and increases in defense expenditure would be calculated compared to the 2021 levels. Second, the Commission launched a Security Action for Europe (SAFE)[6], a new financial instrument which will provide Member States with up to EUR 150 billion of loans[7] backed by the EU budget, helping them to boost their defense capabilities through common procurement[8]. In this regard, Member States may request financial assistance where they plan to carry out activities, expenditures and measures through common procurement with the aim of supporting the adaptation of the EDTIB to the structural changes[9]. More particularly, Member States will need to submit a European Defense Industry Investment Plan including, amongst others, a description of the activities, expenditures and measures for which the loan is requested, the defense products it intends to procure, and, where relevant, the foreseen involvement of Ukraine in the activities[10].  The Commission will then assess if the plan submitted fulfils all the conditions required, making the financial assistance available by means of an implementing decision[11]. Finally, the Plan relies on the European Investment Bank Group (EIB) to widen the scope of its lending to defense and security projects while safeguarding its financing capacity, which, besides unlocking substantial funding, also ought to send a positive signal to the markets. The European Council is now expected to deliberate on both proposals at its upcoming meetings, which should lead to concrete commitments to materialise the vision outlined therein.

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